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Abstract
It has been widely reported that pharmaceutical drug discovery innovation began its major
decline somewhere in the last decade of the 20th century. After reaching a historical high of 53 new
molecular entities (NMEs) in 1996, the industry has since witnessed a steady decline of NME filings
(down to 18 in 2006) with the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER)---despite rapidly
escalating R&D spending among the world's major pharmaceutical firms (the "majors"). Industry
leaders, researchers, and observers have all but acknowledged this drug discovery productivity crisis,
much of it attributed to the industry's preference for and eventual exhaustion of simple, single
molecular targets-the so-called "low-hanging fruit" whose discovery is characteristically attributed
to serendipity. Collectively, pharmacological compounds were identified that targeted the products of
-400-500 genes in the human body over the past five decades. These single-molecular targets-the
majority of which are mechanistically overrepresented by the G-protein coupled receptors and key
enzymes--are now believed to have been mostly discovered and commercialized into the ubiquitous
blockbuster drugs on the market, ranging from statins to proton-pump inhibitors (PPIs).
Historically and nearly coincident with this apparent dearth of new molecular targets was the
advent of the 99% completed euchromatic sequence' of the human genome in 2004, as reported by the
International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium (IHGSC). Launched in 1990, the Human
Genome Project (HGP) thus made available thousands of the approximately 30,000-40,000 estimated
human genes that could be potentially associated with disease. Given the therapeutic promise of the
supposed -3,000 druggable genes2, the major pharmaceutical firms have allocated sizeable investment
into genomics-based drug discovery. The realization of senior research executives that future drug
innovation will likely be based on a multi-gene, systems biology-based model for understanding
complex disease mechanisms of action has resulted in a shift away from reliance on serendipity
toward a model informed by genomic elucidation of inter-pathway connectivity.
In my research, I examined the level and type of genomics-related investments made by
selected majors in the West (U.S., Europe) and Japan. Moreover, I have leveraged genomics as a
"lens" to assess the nature and role of serendipity in drug discovery-which I have posited can be
deconstructed into the two different facets of technological capability and organizational design.
Thirdly, the impact of personal-, firm-, and country-level ethnic & national identity, cultural &
historical legacy, and social factors on productivity are investigated.
Through the use of personal interviews with senior pharmaceutical industry research
executives, an online survey questionnaire completed by research managers and staff, and publicly
available information, it was found that the Western and Japanese majors shared major similarities
surrounding the original impetus to invest in genomics. While Western firms were found to reap
significant benefits from superior scale and decisively 'permeated' genomics as the central platform
technology throughout their drug discovery organizations, Japanese firms were found to exhibit
greater efficiency in resource utilization in genomics-based discovery. Furthermore, the finding of 3
distinctive national culture characterizations for Western, Japanese, and Chinese firms revealed
differential influences on their respective firms' drug discovery practices and productivity.
Finally, the state of China's genomics and life sciences firms was evaluated. Prescriptive
recommendations for the development of the nascent pharmaceutical industry in China, based on
conclusions drawn above, are provided.
Both the IHGSC and Celera Genomics reported draft sequences covering 90% of the human genome in
2001. The "finished" sequence, however, was reported in 2004.
- Hopkins and Groom (2002).
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1. Statement of Purpose and Goals
As the international economy becomes increasingly globalized, so too has the
pharmaceutical industry. Particularly for the Western majors such as U.S.-based Pfizer
and Europe-based GlaxoSmithKline, these large multinational corporations continue to
dominate the $582 billion (in 2006) global pharmaceutical industry. For industry leader
Pfizer, for example, sales outside the U.S. home market represent over 40% of total sales.
Japanese pharmaceutical companies, on the other hand, are unique species in the
pharmaceutical kingdom. Historically fiercely nationalistic and almost solely focused on
the domestic market, the industry has only recently strengthened its investment abroad,
particularly in the $260 billion U.S. market. Large-scale mergers have resulted, for
example the formation of Astellas and Daiichi-Sankyo (both in 2005), in strategic
combinations intended to increase scale necessary to rival the Western majors.
Meanwhile, senior industry executives and analysts express their belief that China
will assume the 3 rd largest pharmaceutical industry by 2050-behind only the U.S. and
Japan.
Yet concurrent with this trend toward increasing globalization is a perceived
increasing nationalism of domestic pharmaceutical industry players-a desire to retain
national, cultural identity while simultaneously morphing into multinational corporations.
At the same time, the ever elusive serendipity question remains unanswered.
While prior research has focused on studying the major players in relative
geographic isolation-i.e. U.S. firms, European firms, or Japanese firms in a single
country context-few, if any, have taken a cross-border perspective toward assessing the
comparative competitiveness of drug discovery productivity, nor has the influence of
national culture and identity been addressed. Moreover, a three-way assessment between
Western, Japanese, and the nascent domestic Chinese pharmaceutical industry has not
been conducted to date.
Thus, the objective of this research study is threefold: 1) to investigate the
influence of national, ethnic, cultural, and social identity on pharmaceutical industry
research productivity; 2) to use genomics as a "lens" to break down the core components
of serendipity in drug discovery (which I have posited can be deconstructed into the two
different facets of technological capability and organizational design); and 3) to
comparatively assess the resulting differential drug discovery practices and productivity
levels between the pharmaceutical industries of the West, Japan, and China.
This thesis will address a set of key questions:
* How does a researcher's national, cultural, and/or ethnic background affect his/her
productivity in the pharmaceutical industry?
* How do Western pharmaceutical companies differ from their Japanese counterparts
with regards to genomics investment? What do these different approaches suggest
about their respective firms?
* Using genomics as a lens, are the Western majors or Japanese majors more successful
at facilitating/optimizing a higher "rate of serendipity" in drug discovery?
* How can the above learnings be applied prescriptively toward China's burgeoning
domestic pharmaceutical industry?
2. Background & Literature Review
2.1 Pharmaceutical Industry: history, evolution, status
2.1.1 Origins of Drug Discovery
It is necessary to delve into the origins of drug discovery in order to fully
appreciate its development history, areas of success attained and challenges encountered,
as well as the important role of chance along its evolutionary pathway. The endeavor of
drug discovery and drug research traces back to the late nineteenth century, circa 1870,
when chemistry had reached a level of maturity in principles and methods to have
evolved applications toward the field of biology-creating the scientific discipline of
pharmacology. By then, Avogadro's atomic hypothesis and the periodic table of the
elements had been established, as had the theory of acids and bases.
In 1865, Kekule's theory on the structure of aromatic organic molecules (benzene
theory) led to the research of coal-tar derivatives, including dyes. It was the selective
affinity of dyes for biological tissues that prompted Ehrlich to postulate the existence of
"chemoreceptors"-such that certain chemoreceptors on parasites, microorganisms, and
cancer cells would be different from analogous structures in host tissues. Ehrlich
contended these differences could be exploited therapeutically (which he termed "magic
bullets"), leading to the birth of chemotherapy.
Drews (2000) notes that analytical chemistry, specifically the isolation and
purification of active ingredients from medicinal plants, also demonstrated therapeutic
value in the 19 th century. Nevertheless, these standardized preparations by pharmacies
were provided as impure drugs.
As medicinal chemistry began to take form, it was recognized that the institutions
thus far engaged in pharmacology-pharmacies, university laboratories, chemical
companies producing dyes-were suitable for an emerging drug research industry
growing in interdisciplinary directions, spanning chemistry, biology, pharmacology, and
clinical science. The result was the formation of new institutions dedicated to supporting
drug discovery and development per se. These entities grew out of pharmacies or were
carved out as pharmaceuticals-focused divisions within chemical or dye companies,
including but not limited to Pfizer, DuPont, Merck, and Roche.
2.1.2 The Meeting of Technology and Serendipity
At the turn of the 19 th to the 20 th century and during the first half of the 20th
century, the new pharmaceutical companies were reliant on nature as the primary source
of new medicinal agents. No other compound epitomized this as much as penicillin, the
metabolite from a penicillium mold able to lyse staphylococci and discovered
serendipitously in 1929 by Alexander Fleming. Penicillin's powerful efficacy and
relative lack of toxicity paved the interest in treatment of bacterial infections; soon the
early pioneer drug companies established microbiology and fermentation departments,
adding new technology toward the building of drug development capability. Some
companies including Merck (U.S.), Sandoz (Switzerland), and Takeda (Japan) used
microbiological methods to find drugs that exerted other pharmacological or
chemotherapeutic properties. This marked the birth of the modem drug development
industry, its design of research organizations divided into functional and technological
disciplines, and the pursuit of drugs across a multitude of therapeutic areas.
Biochemistry was the next logical evolutionary step, the result of which led to the
dominance of the enzyme-receptor concept, the latter being found to serve as empirically
good drug targets. The prominent example of the characterization of carboanhydrase in
1933 and the fortuitous discovery of sulfanilamide as an inhibitor of this enzyme
illustrated the new modus operandi for drug discovery-along with the subsequent
derivation of more effective successors, hydrochlorothiazide and furosemide. Moreover,
the functional concept in which the receptor serves as a "switch" that receives and
generates specific signals and can be either blocked by antagonists or activated by
agonists was introduced by Langley in 1905. Ahlquist took this further with his proposal
of the existence of two different types of adrenotropic receptors.
Thus, a successful model process of drug discovery was established. Beginning
with the most unpredictable step of identifying and sourcing natural compounds,
scientists embarked on the time-consuming and often frustrating step of searching for
positive activity. This would be followed by serial purification of crude extracts to give
smaller and smaller isolates until the active compound was obtained. Once isolated,
these lead compounds-typically structurally complex, available only in small quantities,
and expensive to purify, synthesize, and formulate into drugs-were handed over to
medicinal chemists who worked to make simpler and more bioavailable compounds
based on the original lead. Subsequent synthesis and purification was labor-intensive,
hence severely limiting the number of new compounds produced per year. It is important
to note that as a general rule, the targets and mechanisms of action of these leads were
often unknown.
The sequential development of different therapeutic areas can therefore be
interpreted as chemical diversification that initially occurred spontaneously. Drug
discovery itself was fundamentally premised on the serendipitous finding of biologically
active compounds, from which prototypic structures were derivatized through basic
medicinal chemistry technology in order to obtain compounds with enhanced or
completely novel effects. In short, a strategy for true drug discovery-the de novo,
industry-generated, and non-serendipity dependent invention of new drugs-was an
unattained capability. Drug researchers remained at the mercy of chance for the finding
of new chemical entities.
2.2 The Modern Drug Discovery Model
2.2.1 The Age of Numbers: the Golden Years (c. 1970-1990s)
If new technologies such as medicinal chemistry helped optimize the lead
discovery process of deriving novel drugs from natural sources and compounds, then the
pharmaceutical industry in the second half of the 20th century became exceptionally adept
at "facilitating" serendipity-the use of specific platform technologies and carefully
crafted organizational design structures to create highly efficient research organizations
that screened multitudes of nature-based compounds for physiologic activity (i.e.
increasing the likelihood of finding new drugs).
The adoption of new technologies facilitated cycle times in the discovery process.
The gamut of new techniques progressed from X-ray crystallography (1971) to Kohler
and Milstein's first report of monoclonal antibodies (1975), to Merrifield's method for
the linear solid-phase synthesis of peptides (1984), to the development of automated
peptide synthesizers, then parallel and split-and-pool peptide synthesis (1980s), and
finally to combinatorial synthesis (in which drug-like compounds with various rings and
functional groups could be assembled in a rapid sequence). Since the first small-
molecule combinatorial library based on a known drug scaffold was introduced in the
early 1990s, thousand of unique libraries have been produced.
It was this new ability to generate compounds en masse with combinatorial
methods that shifted drug discovery to its next phase: exploiting the numbers game, or
the "magic of large numbers." In this strategy, large numbers of hypothetical targets are
incorporated into in vitro or cell-based assays and exposed to large numbers of
compounds representing numerous variations on a few chemical themes. Substantial
investments were made to purchase the specialized laboratory equipment for
combinatorial synthesis. It was hoped that these screens for biological activity would
generate many "hits"-compounds that elicit a positive response in a particular assay-
which could then give rise to more leads. Drews (2000) estimated that the number of
data points generated by large screening programs at a pharmaceutical company
amounted to roughly 200,000 at the beginning of the 1990s. This figure rose to 5 to 6
million mid-decade and approached the 50-million mark at the end of the 20th century.
However, this several hundredfold increase in the number of raw data has not yet resulted
in a commensurate increase in research productivity. This was attributed to the fact that
association of various "targets" with certain diseases did not necessarily translate into
suitable intervention levels for new drugs; biological validation was critical.
The next phase thus moved toward combining numerical power with biological
activity. The resulting technologies, combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput
screening (HTS), went beyond characterizing structural descriptors of compound libraries
to screen all compounds in a library against a panel of functionally dissimilar proteins,
and determining the binding affinity of each compound for each protein. The set of
binding affinities for a given compound is termed its affinity fingerprint. The similarity
of affinity fingerprints has been demonstrated to correlate with the biological activities of
druglike substances.
Improvements in structural biology, specifically in nuclear magnetic resonance
spectroscopy, robotic crystallization, X-ray crystallography, and high-speed computing
greatly facilitated protein structure determination. Brenner (1997) pointed out the
concept of structural genomics is well-supported by the fact that the universe of compact
globular protein folds is quite limited, and may not exceed 5,000 distinct spatial
arrangements of peptide chains.
In terms of output, the summation of these technologies proved relatively
successful. In a comprehensive analysis of the accumulated drug portfolio of all targets
in the pharmaceutical industry, Drews (1996) identified 483 molecular targets.
According to the analysis, cell membrane receptors, largely heterotrimeric GTP-binding
protein (G-protein)-coupled receptors, constitute the largest subgroup with 45% of all
targets, and enzymes account for 28% of all current drug targets. With Cohen's (2005)
observation that the top 10% of new drugs (by net present value, NPV) account for 52%
of the total NPV for all new drugs sold worldwide, it becomes clear that this relatively
small group of molecular targets has adequately supported the basis and growth of an
entire industry. Hopkins and Groom (2002) similarly pointed out that this fairly small
number of targets calls into question the common assumption that a large number of
targets are necessary to build a successful industry. On average, they showed that new
drugs were launched against only four novel targets each year. Zambrowicz and Sands
(2003) further pointed out that the 100 best-selling drugs of 2001 were directed at only 43
host proteins. Differentiation between drugs that bind to the same receptor could lead to
the development of several distinct classes, targeting a range of diseases.
In short, the utility of these numbers-based, high throughput mainstay
technologies--combi-chem and HTS in particular-effectively shifted from lead
discovery to lead optimization, as pharmaceutical companies focused their attention on
optimizing the rate of serendipity in drug discovery.
2.2.2 The Productivity Crisis (c. 1990s-today)
Starting in the mid-1990s through present year 2007, however, it became clear
that a productivity crisis in drug discovery was brewing as the sustainability of finding
new molecules fell under question across the industry. After achieving consistently
growing numbers of new molecular entities (NMEs) through the mid-1990s-including
an average of 26 NMEs during the first half of the last decade of the 20th century, leading
up to a historical high of 53 in 1996-the number of FDA-approved NMEs post 1996 has
been in decline ever since (down to 18 in 2005 and 2006), a trend that has held for over
10 years. This long duration indicates a genuine trend, not a outlier phenomenon.
This decline in productivity is more dire when one considers R&D spending in
the industry. Pharmaceutical R&D expenditure (in unadjusted U.S. dollars) rose year-
over-year from approximately $1 billion in 1970 to nearly $40 billion at the end of the
2 0 th century-a historical high.3 DiMasi's landmark study (2003) on the total,
In terms of percentage of sales, R&D spending was stable from 1970 until the latter half of the 1970s, and
then increased linearly until the mid-1990s when it initially stabilized and then began diminishing slightly.
Source: Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).
preapproval drug development cost per new drug of approximately $802 million4 (a surge
from the $138 million and $318 million estimates for similar cost of development in 1975
and 1987, respectively) only accentuates the increasing diminished returns of greater
R&D investment. This figure is expected to rise at an annual rate of 7.5% above general
price inflation.
Other metrics similarly point toward the declining productivity. Cohen (2005)
noted that U.S. pharmaceutical patent activity relative to overall U.S. patent activity
increased beginning in the mid-1990s. Before then, it had been stable as far back as 1976.
However, this increase in activity was attributed to an increase in biotech-related
patenting rather than an increase in patents on small molecule drugs. Furthermore,
increased drug patent activity was largely due to an increase in patenting by universities
and colleges; patent activity by a cohort of major pharmaceutical companies actually
decreased during this period.
Since utility is the primary driver of new drug adoption, a company's profits
suffer unless the quality of some new drugs is sufficient to compete effectively with older
drugs. In other words, a pharmaceutical company must have a "blockbuster" drug (i.e. in
excess of $1 billion in annual sales) with regular frequency in order to keep returns
growing. The recent drug discovery productivity erosion, coupled with significant
generic competition, has resulted in a failure to replenish drug pipelines at a rate
necessary to replace the lost value from patent expirations.
Additionally, it has been noted in a NSF Survey of Industry that during the 34-
year period between 1965 to 1999, the allocation of pharmaceutical industry R&D
expenditures gradually shifted away from applied research and towards development,
with basic research remaining relatively stable; development accounted for more than
60% of R&D expenditures in 1999. An annual PhRMA survey also collected data on the
allocation of R&D funds, and found that since 1976 the industry has allocated relatively
more funds to clinical research (Phase I through IV) and regulatory functions, at the
expense of preclinical research. Together, these three categories accounted for 55% of all
R&D expenditures in 2002. These studies thus suggest an exacerbation of the vicious
cycle of declining productivity: as drug discovery of new NMEs becomes increasingly
difficult, companies invest more time and resources into developing more mature pipeline
candidates and less so into de novo discovery of new drug compounds, in an attempt to
offset the loss in value.
The cause for the growing disconnect between escalating R&D expenditures and
declining productivity has been consistently attributed to exhaustion of the "low-hanging
fruit": simple single-molecular target based drugs. The industry's focus on the less than
500 molecular targets discussed above-a mechanism-driven strategy (e.g. G-protein
coupled receptors, enzymes)-led to investigation of different disease therapeutics based
on already familiar target inhibition mechanisms-of-action, rather than the exploration
and validation of new, complex targets (of a multi-gene nature). The FDA's Director of
Office of New Drugs attributed the recent decrease in approvals to be a direct result of a
4 In year 2000 dollars.
reduced number of new drug applications (NDAs)-the outcome of the increasing
difficulty of finding new chemical entities, particularly based on the reliance of high-
throughout technologies and cell-based assays refined through several decades. A
McKinsey study (2004) showed that of the 32 "breakthrough products" (first of a class)
introduced over the previous decade, only a quarter targeted novel mechanisms of action,
which generated numerous "me-too" compounds based on the pioneer compounds.
Indeed, industry observers such as Fishman (2005) have stated that the next phase of drug
discovery will necessitate the elucidation of inter-pathway connectivity of signaling
networks-their "systems biology."
The major pharmaceutical companies have responded to these increasing drug
discovery challenges in at least two ways. Firstly, the majors have expanded into
investment in new platform technologies, including recombinant DNA technology
starting in the 1970s and 1980s, protein-based drugs (including monoclonal antibodies),
rapid DNA sequencing, and most notably genomics and its associated bioinformatics and
computational automation.
Secondly, as of the late 1990s, each of the major pharmaceutical companies
underwent a scrutinized re-examination of its internal organizational culture and
architecture of its drug discovery groups and research personnel.
The purpose of this study is to explore specifically the impact of genomics
technology on pharmaceutical industry drug discovery productivity. Given genomics'
potential identification of the entire universe of disease-related genes and potential drug
targets, I believe this technology offers a singular, historic opportunity to: 1) leverage as a
"lens" to deconstruct the core components of serendipity in drug discovery; 2) investigate
the role and impact of national, ethnic, cultural, and social identity as well as
organizational factors on research practices and productivity; and 3) comparatively assess
the resulting differential productivity levels between the pharmaceutical industries of the
West, Japan, and China-the top three projected pharmaceutical markets that are
believed will dominate the industry in the first half of the 2 1st century.5
While much of the above refers most closely with the evolution of drug discovery
among the Western major pharmaceutical companies, a brief review of the industry in
Japan and China are necessary.
2.3 Pharmaceutical Industry in Japan
Much was the case with the Western multinational pharmaceutical majors
(hereafter, "MNCs"), it is important to point out that in Japan, some of the leading
pharmaceutical companies have been in existence for over 200 years, having started as
. Source: industry executives.
pharmacies selling traditional medicines.6 In the late 19th century, they began
synthesizing medicines and continued to do so through World War II. After the end of
the war, these firms began licensing drugs created by Western companies, which were
prohibited from entering the Japanese market. Japan's most powerful government
agency, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)7, as the post-war
country's architect of industrial policy, worked with national banks to deploy and finance
a strategy of targeted industrialization of selected sectors, such as maritime construction,
high technology, and pharmaceuticals. 8 Threats from powerful foreign competitors and
conglomerates were precluded due to their exclusion from domestic industry. In this way,
Japan gained precious time to nurture nascent industries into what would become
powerful giants, which would otherwise have been exposed to Western acquisition and
foreign control.
In the 1970s, Japan began lowering official barriers to foreign companies and
passed more stringent patent laws, providing local companies with an incentive to invest
in domestic drug discovery and development. By 2003, the top 10 multinational
companies (MNCs) controlled 27% of the Japanese domestic market.
As of 2007, Japan remains the second largest pharmaceutical market in the world
($58 billion in 2006), and accounting for 34% share of the Asia-Pacific market (11%
share of the worldwide pharmaceutical market). Japan has the highest life expectancy
among all OECD countries, with an average of 82 years. Key therapeutic categories
include cardiovascular (20% of total sales), alimentary/metabolism (14%), anti-infectives
(11%), cytostatics (8%), and CNS (8%). Yet domestic sales have been very sluggish,
eking out only 1.6% growth annually over the past 10 years. The Japanese
reimbursement system, which cuts prices on older drugs every two years (ranging from
3% to 9.7% a year), coupled with a lack of new product innovations, can be attributed to
this lackluster performance. The dearth of new drugs is in turn the result of poor R&D
productivity and the regulatory system's painstakingly slow approval process, which
emphasizes safety over innovation and averages 5 to 7 years longer to launch than in the
U.S. New drugs generally reach the Japanese market years after they are launched in the
U.S. or Europe. Diller (2005) noted that between 1986 and 1990, when R&D spending
was growing steadily, Japanese companies averaged 19 NMEs per year; but as R&D
spending flattened between 1991 and 1995, by the second half of the decade NMEs
dropped to an average of 9 per year. Think On further noted that of the 178 NMEs
launched worldwide between 1999 and 2003, only 47 were launched in Japan. In the
mid-1990s, drug spending also began to decline, falling 16.5% between 1998 and 2003.
Japanese companies constrained by cultural traditions and biases against certain
"Western" unmet needs such as stress-related syndromes, birth control, and CNS
disorders have also limited consumer acceptance.
6 Most of the largest Western pharmaceutical companies-such as Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Merck,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Roche-have enjoyed 100+ year-old company histories, with beginning roots in
chemicals production.
Created in 1949 post-war Japan. MITI's role was assumed by the newly created Ministry of Economy,
Trade, and Industry (METI) in 2001.
E As pointed out by business historian Thomas McCraw in Creating Modern Capitalism (1998).
In recent years, however, significant reform has been rapidly underway. In 2003,
the government announced its "Vision for the Pharmaceutical Industry" to boost basic
research capability, make Japan an international hub for clinical trials, and consider a
reevaluation of its pricing system. The adoption of the Common Technical Document
(CTD) protocol in July 2003, requiring only additional clinical trials in Japan only if
there exists data showing a drug's differential effect across races, eliminates the prior
prerequisite of foreign companies to conduct fresh clinical trials in Japan for new drug
approvals.
Japanese law also historically required that companies manufacture a portion of
their products in-house. This both precluded a company from outsourcing its production
and meant that a MNC had to partner with a local firm to get its products manufactured in
Japan. In most cases, the Japanese firm was able to negotiate a deal that compensated the
MNC with royalty fees, instead of a share of the sales revenue-an arrangement clearly
more attractive to the domestic entity. As of April 2005, however, revisions to the
Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (PAL) 9 allow Japanese manufacturers to outsource
production; Tanabe Seiyaku, Astellas, Daiichi and Mitsubishi have already announced
plans to divest their respective manufacturing operations.
As barriers to entry against foreign firms have been removed, global MNCs have
moved aggressively into the market. A new law passed in June 2005 will effectively
allow foreign companies to use stock to buy Japanese companies starting in 2007. In
spring 2005, three years after the first-ever acquisition of a Japanese pharmaceutical
company by a foreign company-Roche's purchase of 50.1% of Chugai-several MNCs
have announced their plans to expand in the country. With their deep-pocketed R&D
budgets, newer products, and sales & marketing savvy, MNCs pose a large threat to
domestic rivals.
Two tiers of Japanese pharmaceutical companies with differential levels of
performance have already emerged. Affiliates of foreign firms are achieving sustained
growth, while the domestic industry has stagnated and badly needs R&D revitalization.
While the latter averaged only an anemic 3.5% revenue growth in 2005, Pfizer Japan
reported 20% growth in the same period. MNCs' growth has derived from new drug
approvals, innovative products that are less impacted by price cuts than older drugs.
Additional legislative changes have also made MNC licensing deals with local companies
less necessary than before. Four of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in Japan
today-Pfizer, Novartis, Banyu (Merck)' , and Chugai (Roche)-are foreign-based.
Already, Pfizer Japan Inc. ranks as the largest pharmaceutical entity in Japan by market
9 The primary body of law dating back to 1943 that ensures the safety, efficacy, and quality of
pharmaceuticals and other medical products. The Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau in the Ministry
of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) oversees the enforcement of the PAL. The PAL has undergone
major revision since 2002, including the establishing of a new approvals agency, the Pharmaceuticals and
Medical Devices Agency (PMDA), and new focus on safety and post-market surveillance rather than
manufacturing standards. The PMDA began operations on April 1, 2005, and combines several former
agencies, to speed up Japan's notoriously slow approval process.
10 In 2003, Merck increased its ownership in Banyu from 51% to more than 99%.
share; Japan's largest domestic pharmaceutical firm, Takeda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., is
ranked only as the 15th largest drug company worldwide and is one-fifth of the size of
Pfizer. IMS Global Insight estimates that drugs developed in foreign countries now
account for nearly 50% of the Japanese market.
In the face of this intensifying foreign competition, the domestic industry has at
last witnessed its first significant consolidation after two decades of relative complacency.
On April 1, 2005, Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. and Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co.
Ltd. completed their merger to create Astellas Pharma, Inc., Japan's second largest
pharma company."1 Mid-sized companies Dainippon Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. and
Sumitomo Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. also announced their merger. In February 2005,
Sankyo Co., then the second largest domestic firm, announced its acquisition of Daiichi
Pharmaceutical Co., Japan's sixth largest drug firm.
Lastly, Japanese firms are also realizing the importance of expanding operations
abroad. Eisai Co. Ltd., the fourth largest domestic company following the Astellas
merger, generates 50% of sales outside Japan, and with 42% of total sales from the U.S.,
is the only Japanese company to be included in the top 20 in the U.S. Takeda also draws
50% of revenues from overseas, and is aggressively expanding operations in North
America.
It is thus apparent that from the drug discovery standpoint, the Japanese majors
face similar challenges as the Western MNCs in the quest for new NMEs. One objective
of this study is to assess the genomics-related investments made by Japanese
pharmaceutical companies-firms in the process of transforming their corporate structure,
organization culture, research strategy, and domestic identity. A comparison of Japanese
majors against Western firms can then be made to explore the influence of national
culture and identity on their differential drug discovery productivity.
2.4 Pharmaceutical Industry in China
Though China's pharmaceutical industry is in its nascent stages-with
unpredictable lapses in intellectual property protection, the absence of a large national
market, recent serious health crises, and low healthcare per capita income expenditure-
China has represented both a windfall opportunity and a wholly welcomed outlet from
the pricing pressures, patent expirations, lack of innovation, and negative consumer
opinion experienced by the pharmaceutical industry in the West. Though total China
pharmaceutical drug sales in 2006 amounted to only $10 billion' 2, a mere fraction of the
$260 billion in sales achieved in the U.S., the year-over-year growth rate of China's
pharmaceutical industry is about three-fold that of the U.S. Indeed, the U.S. is still by far
the dominant market, representing 48% of the world pharmaceutical market; Europe and
" Coincidentally, this occurred on the same day that the PAL's revisions on pricing, new approvals, and
separation of manufacturing from marketing, went into effect.
12 Mergent reported total pharmaceutical sales of $21 billion for 2004, per China's State Information Center.
Barron's Online reported a different estimate for China's prescription drug sales, at $12 billion, the ninth
largest in the world, for the same period.
Japan followed with $173 billion (30% share) and $58 billion (10% share), respectively.
This U.S. lead, however, was slightly eroded to 44.7% in June 2005 by significantly
increased sales in China. In fact, within the industry, China's robust 14% annual growth
rate easily trumps the lackluster 5% growth observed in the mature U.S. market, the 6%
growth in the European Union (12% in the rest of Europe), and Japan's historical, anemic
1.5% (though posted 6.8% in 2005, its best since 1991)13. Despite estimates that sales in
the Chinese market contribute only 1% toward total revenues for each of the Western
pharmaceutical MNCs, the lure of China's huge population and economic boom is too
great to pass up, too costly and unforgivable an error if ignored by senior management.
Industry executives operating in China today consistently state that it is China's
immense growth potential 14 that leads to the belief that the Chinese pharmaceutical
market will become the 3 rd largest in the world-and the primary source of expansion-
in the next 50 years.15
The current breakneck pace of China's pharmaceutical industry seen today is a
recent phenomenon. Prior to the 1980s, the industry was comprised of small state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) that received inputs from and supplied their products to the
government, in the absence of competition. In the mid-1980s, the government began
easing controls and allowing competition among suppliers. As the liberalization
continued into the 1990s, financing from the state began its decline. Larger domestic
companies responded by issuing stock on local exchanges, which new intellectual
property laws' 6 implemented in 1993 encouraged Western pharmaceutical MNCs to
establish joint ventures with local firms. IMS Global Insight (2005) reported that 20 of
the 25 global pharmaceutical companies established JVs on the mainland.
The central government has not achieved much success in its attempt to
encourage consolidation among the domestic producers. In the fragmented Chinese
market, provincial authorities have issued rules to protect their own respective regions,
favoring their own local firms over those of another province or from a joint venture.
China's domestic pharmaceutical industry supplies about 60% of internal demand,
with the balance imported from Europe, Japan, and the U.S. Cygnus (2004) reported that
domestic companies control 70% of the Chinese pharmaceuticals market, though this
figure is likely to erode substantially as the Western MNCs acquire significant market
share post China's accession to the WTO. While China's healthcare system once
provided basic care to an estimated 85% of the population, the central and local
governments' contribution now amounts to just 10% of total spending on healthcare. The
13 Likely attributable to the domestic Japanese mega-mergers in 2005, as discussed above.
14 IMS Global Insight reports that the worldwide pharmaceutical market is expected to grow by 6-9%
between 2005 and 2009. China, ranked as the ninth largest individual market in 2006, is predicted by be
ranked eighth by 2008, and possibly higher, with 13-16% compound annual growth expected through 2008
-- eclipsing the other major markets.
'5 Life sciences merchant bank Burrill & Co, believes that it will be at least the fifth largest by 2010 with a
total turnover of US$24 billion.
16 Prior to 1993, domestic producers were able, under Chinese law, to copy drugs with foreign patents.
upshot is that the Chinese pay a substantial portion of healthcare costs out-of-pocket,
leading to widespread disparities in access to healthcare.
Among China analysts, academicians, and key thought leaders, there has been
substantial variability in opinion regarding projected future prospects for China's
domestic pharmaceutical industry. While some are strongly convinced of Chinese
companies' eventual emergence onto the global pharmaceutical stage, others hold
steadfastly to the belief that domestic firms will be outperformed by the MNCs. What is
undisputed, however, is that China's pharma industry is severely fragmented, labor-
intensive, and relatively unsophisticated, producing mostly generic drugs for local use.
Most companies are unprofitable, few have R&D activities, and many rely on copies of
foreign patented products. China's domestic industry is the world's largest producer of
penicillin and other antibiotics, which comprise 35% of the pharmaceutical market.
While these firms are emphasizing low-technology, antiquated antibiotics amid
government-initiated price cuts and intense competition, deep-pocketed foreign
companies are taking advantage of tighter regulatory controls, new IP protection, and
pricing favorable to new drugs to invest more heavily in R&D.
It remains a fact that 97% of drugs made in China are generic copies of foreign
innovative products. A large number of these copies are products of legally legitimate
entities, which have received marketing approval from the government; these operations
are separate and distinct from counterfeit drugs, which are not sanctioned by the
government and represent a different type of challenge for foreign MNCs. It is estimated
that historically, between 5,000 and 6,000 companies made about 1,300 different types of
Western-style drugs (in addition to traditional Chinese medicines, or TCMs).
China's accession to the WTO 17 has encouraged MNCs to become more active in
establishing sales & marketing as well as R&D operations. These foreign firms have
accumulated substantial market share relative to the domestic drug industry; of the 50
best-selling drugs in China, 40 are made by foreign firms. Different MNCs, however, are
pursuing alternative China investment strategies, as driven by different motivations
including lowering research costs, to exploring the potential of TCMs, to establishing
genuine drug discovery centers (S&P Asia Pharmaceuticals Industry Survey, 2005).
A major demographic shift is underway between the U.S. and China. The original
intent of Deng Xiaoping's decision in 1978 to send students from China to study abroad
had been to rebuild China's scientific community, following the catastrophic reduction
during the anti-intellectual Cultural Revolution. Now, the previously recognized and
highly touted "brain drain" of the 1980s and 1990s, whereby international graduate and
doctoral students from countries worldwide arrived in the U.S. to study science and
technology-with subsequent permanent residence-appears to be coming to an end.
David Zweig' 8 of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and others have
~7 China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001.
8 Co-author of China's Brain Drain to the United States, U.C. Berkeley: East Asian Institute, China
Research Monograph (1995). Zweig also notes that the returnee phenomenon is mostly a male one, as
estimated that the number of returnees has been growing at 15% every year since 1994,
and has cited numerous factors as being responsible for this phenomenon:
* Difficulty of obtaining a U.S. visa following President Bush's post-September 11,
2001 directive calling for stricter enforcement of immigration laws;
* Discrimination against non-white minorities (e.g. Chinese) in the U.S., particularly
for senior management positions-fallacy of the American Dream, "second class"
citizenship;
* Attractiveness of significant professional and economic opportunities in working
in China/Asia, and of participating in the growth of the Chinese economy;
* Less concern over political instability of the Chinese government;
* Market liberalization and expansion of the private sector have encouraged
entrepreneurship;
* China's accession to the WTO leads to greater assurance of IP protection, and
returnees can act as go-betweens, helping foreign MNCs enter the domestic
Chinese market;
* Growth in number of foreign MNCs in China, offering attractive lifestyles 19;
* Government-offered incentives including tax benefits and research grants.
The pool of overseas human capital is large. As of 2003, there were 130,000 mainland
Chinese students in the U.S. and 40,000 in Japan, with 50,000 and 15,000 respectively
holding permanent residence. According to a Chinese evaluation, 3-5% of the 50,000
permanent residents in the U.S. are classed as "exceptional" (associate professors or
department heads in large enterprises), while another 10% are categorized as "rather
talented." Some 7.5% of the Ph.D. degrees in science and tech in the U.S. are awarded to
Chinese citizens.
This trend is nothing short of a reverse brain drain. According to the Chinese Statistical
Yearbook, whereas only one in three of the 320,000 overseas Chinese studying abroad
returned home during the period 1978 to 1999, a 2001 survey revealed that over 60% are
now willing to return home within 5 to 10 years-many of whom possess U.S.
educational training as well as work experience. Today, more than 1,700 private firms
are run by overseas returnees-"sea turtles"-in Shanghai, an increase of 80% since
2001.
In terms of drug discovery research activity itself, the Chinese government has
invested heavily in the construction of life sciences industrial research parks since 2001.20
women prefer the foreign lifestyle, better educational opportunities for their children, and are wary of
gender inequality back in the mainland.
19 Many packages, however, are offered at the significantly lower local native rate.
20 This investment of public funds into biotechnology is similar to the creation of the research parks in
Japan during the 1980s, such as Tsukuba City. China's largest life sciences industrial park is China Beijing
Mergent (2006) reported that the government quadrupled the national life sciences and
biotech budget in its 10 th Five-Year Program (2001-2005) from the previous five-year
period to RMB 13 billion (US$1.6 billion). Investment in life sciences and biotech could
amount to RMB50 billion (US$6.2 billion) in the 1 1th Five-Year Program (2006-2010)
according to the Ministry of Science and Technology. China now has approximately 20
biotechnology parks dispersed around the country and 500 biotechnology enterprises,
focused mostly on medicine and agriculture, according to the National Center for Biotech
Development. Research is substantially engaged in areas such as genomics, proteomics,
stem cell research, genetically modified seeds and gene therapy.
Unlike the Western and Japanese majors, however, Chinese pharmaceutical firms
spent only 2% to 5% of sales on R&D, a difference even more pronounced given that the
nation's leading pharmaceutical companies recorded less than $500 million in 2006
annual sales, a figure dwarfed by the MNCs21 . Indeed, China's pharmaceutical industry
is much more skewed toward a business-driven model than a research-driven model
(Mergent 2006).
Most relevantly for this study, genomics stands out as a relatively more mature
technology in which China has developed world-class capability22, as evidenced by the
Beijing Genomics Institute's completion of the sequencing of 1% of the human genome
and completion of the rice genome. Though China's research emphasis within genomics
has placed greater emphasis on sequencing than with application to drug research, an
assessment of the use of genomics as a lens to conduct a comparative assessment of
China's research organizations against the Western and Japanese pharmaceutical majors
in exploring impact on drug discovery, role of organizational factors, and the influence of
national identity, is still meaningful.
2.5 The Genomics Revolution
The completion of the sequencing of the human genome in 2001 marked the
euchromatic coverage of the approximately 30,000 to 40,000 human genes. The Human
Genome Project (HGP) was an international collaboration begun in 1990 and officially
completed April 14, 2003. Independently reported by both the International Human
Genome Sequencing Consortium (IHGSC) and Celera Genomics, the draft sequence
provided a first overall view of the human genome, allowing a systematic identification
of genes, combinational architecture of proteins, regional differences in genome
composition, distribution and history of transposable elements, distribution of
polymorphism and relationship between genetic recombination and physical distance.23
In 2004, the international consortium-which involved 20 sequencing centers in six
Bioengineering and Pharmaceutical Industrial Park, which has 7,000 acres of land available for
development.
2 For comparison, global pharmaceutical industry leader and U.S.-based Pfizer spent $7.6 billion in R&D,
approximately 16% of the $48 billion recorded total company sales in 2006.As noted by Science Magazine author Dennis Normile (2002).
23 As listed among the primary goals of the Human Genome Project.
countries-then announced completion of a "finished" sequence (Build 35) that contains
2.85 billion nucleotides. This final version is interrupted by only 341 gaps, and covers
-99% of the euchromatic genome with accuracy to an error rate of-1 event per 100,000
bases. It is now believed that the human genome encodes only 20,000 to 25,000 protein-
coding genes (IHGSC, 2004).
Of the total number of predicted genes, however, only -3,000 loci (about 10-14%
of all human genes) are considered druggable. 24 Russ and Lampel (2005) defined
druggability as the presence of protein folds that favor interactions with drug-like
chemical compounds. Additionally, many proteins are druggable according to their
structure, but modulating their biological function will not provide any therapeutic
benefit; only about 20% of these targets have disease relevance (Betz et al, 2005). The
main parameters influencing the count are: coverage of sequence databases, tools used
for sequence annotation, structural information about folds, bioinformatics tools, and
biological information about protein function.
A revised protein domain classification has resulted in dominance by the two
largest families, protein kinases and rhodopsin-like GPCRs, representing approximately
500 and 300 drug targets, respectively. The third largest group, proteases, represents
about 230 targets. While estimates for specific protein classes continue to be updated, it
is expected that numbers for kinases, GPCRs and smaller target families will remain
stable. Hopkins and Groom (2002) reported in a seminal paper that only 130 protein
families represent the known drug targets.25
Finally, it should be noted that the druggable genome estimates the potential
maximum size of the playing field for current small-molecule drug design, and does not
consider biologic therapeutics, RNAi, DNA vaccines, and non-oral drug delivery systems.
The allure of genomics and its associated technologies (Figure 1) rests with both
its promise of expanding the pool of drug targets and the mapping of every possible drug
target exploitable for the range of human disease. Inherent in this endeavor is the implied
ability to gradually shift away from the current drug discovery model of reliance on
serendipity (i.e. drug discovery based on natural sources).
24 As reported by various researchers, including Russ and Lampel (2005), Betz et al (2005), and Hopkins &
Groom (2002).
:,5 Of all marketed small-molecule drugs, targets have the following representation: enzymes (47%), GPCRs(30%), ion channels (7%), other biochemical class (16%).
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Figure 1. Introduction of various genomics technologies.
Source: Current Opinion in Chemical Biology (2005).
An early attempt at moving from nature-based scaffolds to de novo design of new
molecular entities was rational drug design. This approach occupied the limelight in the
1990s with its proposition of integrating chemists, X-ray crystallographers, cell biologists
and others into functional teams that could expeditiously assimilate data for the molecular
design of precisely targeted drugs for any disease in which a causative protein was
implicated. Outside of HIV protease inhibitors26, however, few successful drugs resulted.
A second wave of activity involved the emergence of pure-play genomics
companies. Firms including Human Genome Sciences, Millennium, and Celera centered
their strategy on the development of proprietary technology or knowledge-based assets
protected by patents. These comprised of databases and platform technologies that
formed the basis of alliances with pharmaceutical/biotechnology partners in the early to
mid-1990s, set up via licenses and subscription fees27. The pharmaceutical majors looked
to these companies to bolster their pipelines with validated targets and/or lead compounds.
Rothman and Kraft (2006) noted, however, that this target identification business model
was short-lived due to three reasons: 1) the widened availability of DNA sequencing
technologies and sequence databases by the late 1990s reduced these assets to
commodities; 2) target generation and screening technologies (especially combinatorial
chemistry and HTS) were readily adopted and integrated within big pharma, eventually
becoming "generic" technologies; and 3) by 2000, with the industry was awash with new
targets about which little was known, value began to reside in knowledge about targets.
:26 Most notably Viracept (nelfinavir), approved in 1997, as demonstrated by Agouron Pharmaceuticals.
:27 Some of the largest collaboration deals include: Novartis/Vertex (2000: $815 million), Bayer/CuraGen
(2001: $750 million), Aventis/Millennium (2000: $650 million), Roche/deCODE (1998: $205 million), and
Bayer/Millennium (1998: $465 million).
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With the subsequent collapse of the genomics bubble in 2000, the genomic
companies migrated downstream into drug development to become fully integrated
pharmaceutical companies (FIPCO) in their own right (Rothman et al, 2006). This
evolution in business model was achieved through both internal drug discovery efforts28
and acquisitions29. These firms thus assumed the concomitant high risk and massive
investment necessary to undertake this endeavor in an attempt to retain control and value,
and many chose to focus on protein therapeutics/monoclonal antibodies, small molecules,
or other disease or functional divisions. Consolidation30 has since resulted due in part to
avoid technological obsolescence and in part to pool resources, particularly since several
players in the sector have failed or declared bankruptcy3 --attributed mostly to cash
shortages. Most importantly, the viability of genomic companies in becoming "mini-
Mercks" or "mini-Pfizers" (Gura, 2002) remains questionable, particularly since sector
leaders such as Human Genome Sciences have failed to achieve successful discovery,
development and marketing approval of a single product, despite numerous pipeline
candidates 32 throughout its 13-year history (Herrera, 2005).
2.5.1 Knockout Models
One of the principal genomic technologies that has proven most effective in drug
target validation is the in vivo use of knockout mice for the systematic modeling of drug
efficacy and determination of the physiological functions of mammalian genes. An
examination of the targets of the 100 best-selling drugs revealed that in the majority of
cases, there is a direct correlation between the KO phenotype and the efficacy of drugs
which modulate that specific target (Zambrowicz et al, 2003). Novel targets in neurology,
metabolism, cardiology, immunology, oncology and other disease areas have been
validated using KO techniques. An analysis by Zambrowicz et al showed that for
pipeline drugs of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies, 85% demonstrate a sound
biological rationale for the selected disease indication on the basis of KO phenotypes.
Lexicon Genetics has reported an ongoing five-year program to mine its estimated top
5,000 druggable gene targets from the human genome, using systematic knockout mice.
2.5.2 Chemogenomics
:8 HGS and Celera.
29 Structural GenomiX acquired Prospect Genomics, Millennium acquired Cambridge Discovery Chemistry.30 Such as Sequenom's merger with Gemini Genomics in May 2001, Hyseq and Variagenics to form
Novelo in 2002, Biogen and IDEC to form BiogenIDEC in 2003, and COR Therapeutics and Millennium
in 2001.
i' Deltagen declared bankruptcy in 2003. Genset encountered cash shortage in 2002, leading to a sale of
the company to Serono.
32 Including the highly touted myeloid progenitor inhibitor factor-I, the first genomics-derived drug to
move into clinical trials (in 1997), which was subsequently terminated in development due to unsatisfactory
biological activity.
A second most promising gene-based approach to therapeutics is the application
of "chemical genomics," or chemogenomics. In the context of the thousands of estimated
human genes associated with disease, technologies that can move rapidly from gene to
drug are needed. Chemogenomics, the integration of high-throughput genomics and
chemistry, allows for screening large collections of compounds for the parallel
identification of biological targets and biologically active compounds. Although the
chemogenomics strategy appears to have much in common with the large-scale
serendipity (discussed earlier), it differs from conventional library screening because of
its acceleration of the drug discovery process, linkage to genomic methodologies (e.g. in
silico virtual screening, siliconization, automation) and bilateral directionality (i.e.
moving from target to phenotype or phenotype to target). In 'reverse chemogenomics',
gene sequences of interest are first cloned and expressed as target proteins, then screened
for binding affinity ('hits'). In 'forward chemogenomics', the molecular basis of a
desired phenotype is unknown; cell-based or organismal phenotypic compounds are
assayed to elucidate the mechanistic basis of the phenotype by identifying the gene and
protein targets. Finally, 'predictive chemogenomics' holistically uses genomic and
pharmacological responses to form a drug profile or 'fingerprint', allowing the prediction
of gene-drug relationships.
Nevertheless, Bredel and Jacoby (2004) have commented that genomics might be
currently doing more to hinder drug discovery programs than to stimulate them: the sheer
volume of data generated by chemogenomic analyses creates a gap between drug
discovery and drug development. Consequently, the design, adaptation, and refinement
of sophisticated front-end computational approaches that can assist in making an
informed, quick decision as to which hits should be pursued will be crucial for the
success of chemogenomics. Indeed, chemogenomics faces many data management
challenges, specifically the complex integration of information about ligands and targets.
Bredel and Jacoby pointed out that integrating the two ontologies of protein structure and
protein function, along with molecular interactions, remains the central difficulty.
Genomics-based drug discovery is still in its nascent stage. The fundamental
question of whether genomics has succeeded or failed to deliver new drug targets is yet to
be answered definitively, especially given the lag effect between initial technological
investment and subsequent extractable output. A seminal joint study by McKinsey and
Lehman Brothers (2001) reported that "while...research confirmed that the widely held,
long-term optimism for genomics-based drugs is justified, we conclude that the path to
that end will be more complex than is conventionally anticipated. This complexity may
result in a few disappointing years for those who are expecting an explosion in new drug
approvals and an improvement in yield on research and development costs."
The relative novelty of genomics technology to the pharmaceutical majors affords
an excellent opportunity to conduct a differential assessment between firms in the West,
Japan and China in terms of pattern of investment, resulting output and benefits, and the
role of national/ethnic identity on drug discovery.
2.6 Organizational Aspects of Drug Discovery
Much empirical work has been published in the last decade pertaining to the
organizational aspects of drug discovery and R&D productivity within the
pharmaceutical industry. I shall discuss them here in their broad general categories those
topics with greatest relevance to this study. While topics have ranged from researching
geographical factors to pharmaceutical-biotechnology research alliances, no research as
yet, however, was found that examined drug discovery serendipity and productivity from
the perspective of a single technology (i.e. genomics ) or cross-national comparison.
2.6.1 Spillovers
Early research suggested that prior to 1962 there were significant diseconomies of
scale but that since 1962 larger firms have enjoyed important economies of scale in R&D
(Comanor (1965, 1986), Baily (1972), Cocks (1973), Vernon and Gusen (1974),
Grabowski et al. (1978), Schwartzman (1976), Wiggens (1979), Jensen (1987). Most of
these studies interpreted this result as suggesting that the increased regulatory stringency
that followed the 1962 amendments to the Food and Drug Act conferred an advantage to
larger firms in allowing them to exploit economies of scope in dealing with the regulatory
agency. However, it was not until Henderson and Cockburn's seminal paper on scale,
scope, and spillovers in the pharmaceutical industry in 1993 that systematically explored
the role of spillovers in the industry. This study showed three benefits to running
research programs within the context of larger and more diversified R&D efforts:
economies of scale arising from sharing fixed costs; economies of scope arising from the
opportunity to exploit knowledge across program boundaries within the firm; and the
enhanced ability to absorb internal and external spillovers.
Jaffe et al. (2001) further demonstrated the geographic localization of R&D
knowledge spillovers in the pharmaceutical industry, in the form of citations; citations to
domestic patents are more likely to be domestic. The localization effect was found to
fade over time, but only very slowly. Frost (2001) discussed the tradeoffs MNCs face
between being "home based" or "distributed." In the pharmaceutical industry, Chacar
and Lieberman (2003) and Furman (2003) argued that this tradeoff is particularly salient
- global pharmaceutical firms can organize their research efforts in a single site in order
to maximize the advantages of internal scope and scale, or they can decentralize their
research efforts with the aim of accessing knowledge spillovers that are only available
across the globe. Furman et al. (2006) showed that locally generated knowledge is
strongly correlated with research productivity, but that this positive correlation is driven
overwhelmingly by the impact of publicly generated knowledge. Privately generated
knowledge appeared to be negatively correlated with productivity. These findings
suggest a complex tradeoff between the between the desire to locate close to sources of
academic knowledge on the one hand and the desire to avoid competing too closely with
33 Limited research was found on the related topic of pharmacogenomics (PG), the use of genomic markers
to predict drug response. Vernon and Hughen (2005) examined the economics of PG and reported its
potential to reduce both expected drug development costs and returns.
rivals on the other, and that it is possible that overly dispersing research activities may
have a negative effect on productivity.
2.6.2 Competence
A multitude of studies have explored the organizational competence of the
pharmaceutical firm. Henderson and Cockburn (1994) introduced the concepts of
'component competence' (the possession of skills or assets specific to particular local
activities within the firm) and 'architectural competence' (the firm's ability to integrate
knowledge). Several other preceding studies are consistent with these findings. Nelson
(1991) found that successful research efforts typically take many years to build and often
rely on idiosyncratic search routines that may be very difficult to transfer across
organizations. Allen (1977), Allen et al. (1980) and Katz (1988) discovered that firms
that nurture the development of 'gatekeepers'-key individuals who bridge the gap
between the firm and its environment and that aggressively stimulate the exchange of
information between individuals-are likely to outperform those that do not. The role of
information exchange and experience-sharing is further emphasized by Danzon et al.
(2003), who found evidence that a drug is more likely to complete Phase II if developed
by firms with considerable therapeutic category-specific experience. Additionally,
results confirmed that products developed in a pharmaceutical-biotechnology alliance had
a higher probability of success, at least for Phases II and III. Finally, Henderson and
Cockburn (1994) concluded that idiosyncratic firm effects account for a very substantial
fraction of the variance in research productivity across the firms in their sample, and that
research productivity increased with historical success.
3. Hypothesis Development
3.1 The Genomic Lens of Drug Discovery Productivity
Most of the academic literature treats R&D as one functional unit (Cohen, 1989)
or where drug discovery is explicitly analyzed distinctly, is focused on examining
productivity from an isolated country-mostly Western-perspective. There is also
substantive work on the impact of economies of scale/scope, group-group dynamics, even
individual-group dynamics on R&D productivity (Allen et al., 1977, 1980). There is,
however, surprising relatively limited discussion directly addressing and deconstructing
the nature of serendipity as a critical factor in drug discovery. Secondly, drug discovery
productivity studies in the literature have examined firms over time across different
technologies, instead of concentrating on one specific technology. Thirdly, a cross-
national differential productivity comparison between domestic pharmaceutical firms
based in the West versus those based in Japan and other nations is noticeably absent.34
14 It should be noted that Okada and Kawara (2004) reported a positive correlation between domestic
Japanese competitors' research spending and individual firm's patenting. A negative correlation between
research expenditures of large Western pharmaceutical firms and Japanese firms' spending was also found,
suggesting the former may be well engaged in a fierce patent race, in which the latter's patenting may be
effectively blocked.
Lastly, the influence of national identity, ethnicity, and cultural history on drug discovery
productivity appears to be completely absent from the literature.
I contend that genomics offers an ideal "lens" with which to assess the above
areas, particularly given its unequivocal import in dru§ discovery, recent novelty,
relatively narrow technological focus, limited history3 , and direct role in "facilitating"
serendipity toward identifying and validating new target genes or lead compounds. Such
a focused analysis using one technology allows for ease and clarity in conducting a cross-
country differential assessment of the factors conducive to serendipity and the influence
of national/cultural factors in drug discovery productivity.
3.2 Hypothesis I
The supposition has always been that the pharmaceutical majors in the world,
given their similarity in capitalization, scale, organization, research of specific disease
areas, and investment in like technologies, shared the same fundamental modus operandi.
It has been pointed out, for example, that since the 1970s, the established pharmaceutical
industry has uniformly slowly shifted towards a more science-oriented approach to drug
discovery research.36 Faced with the same factors, technological opportunities, and
industry demand curve, firms will, in equilibrium, operate with the same capital-labor
ratio, and cost-minimization drives all firms to adopt the same (or essentially similar)
organizational practices. 37 To the extent that theories accommodate asymmetry, the
sources of those differences has historically been extremely narrow: the sunk cost gains
from incumbency (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1981), learning-by-doing cost advantages
(Spence, 1981), or stochastic shocks not under the firm's control (Jovanovic, 1979).
It was not until more recent work (Chandler,1962; Enos, 1962; Abernathy, 1977;
Rumelt, 1991; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) that suggested variation in organizational
practice could be responsible for differences in productivity. Cockburn, Henderson, and
Stern (1999) went further and investigated the reason pharmaceutical firms' 'fixed
effects' remain persistent despite the recognition that differences across firms are
primarily due to differential adoption of organizational practices. This study concluded
that while some portion of the heterogeneity in adoption of new organizational practices
can be linked to observable characteristics of firms and their environment, the lion's
share of explained variation reflects the long-lasting influence of difficult to observe,
firm-specific, historical commitments.3 8
These findings strongly support the idea of difficult-to-measure, intangible factors
contributing toward differential inter-firm performance. Within the context of R&D
performance and specifically drug discovery and the facilitation of serendipity, these
35 Less than 10 years of data (from 2001 to present).
36 Cockburn et al., 1999
37 Ibid.
38 Such factors were cited: distribution of power and attention within the organization, association with the
firm's sales in a particularly therapeutic category, and leading position in the market.
findings would no doubt apply. I contend that these inter-firm variations are likely most
significant between the pharmaceutical majors based in different "home nations."
Surprisingly, there is no literature discussion on the influence of heterogeneity between
the Western pharmaceutical and Japanese pharmaceutical industry, despite the obvious
cultural differences. This leads to the question of whether such cross-national
heterogeneity leads to differences in drug discovery productivity-specifically, the two
components of technology investment and organizational design that I believe are critical
in elucidating the nature of serendipity. Thus I hypothesize:
HI: Idiosyncratic differences in the pattern of technological investment
and organizational design lead to distinct differences in the
'"facilitation" of serendipity between Western and Japanese
pharmaceutical firms.
3.3 Hypothesis II
Cockburn, Henderson and Stemrn (1999) also noted that interviewees in their
pharmaceutical study strenuously highlighted geographical location, corporate culture,
attitudes on the part of managers towards participation in science, and the vision of
particularly powerful leaders within the organization as a large source of systematic
differences between firms in their 'initial conditions'. Moreover, Gino and Pisano (2006)
observed the impact of heuristics used by R&D managers in decision-making, which led
to fluctuations in R&D performance. Such research points toward the influence of
individuals' actions on pharmaceutical research practices and productivity and suggests
the importance of contributions on the individual level. Continuing from my conjecture
in Hypothesis 1, I contend that the individual researcher's self-identity and ethnic-cultural
attitudes, based on his/her pharmaceutical firm's national identity and corporate history,
have profound influence on the firm's research practices and productivity. If my
conjecture is correct, evidence for this organizational memory and national/cultural pride
will naturally surface, be detectable, and will be observed prominently. Thus I
hypothesize:
H2: The nature of a pharmaceutical firm's national identity, intrinsic
cultural 9 attitudes, organizational memory, and industrial/corporate
history influences the firm's drug discovery practices and productivity.
39 Ethnicity, as opposed to organizational "culture".
4. Methodology
Two different primary methods were used to gather data to test the two
hypotheses.
4.1 Personal Interviews with Senior Executives
In the first method, I conducted a series of on-site interviews 40 with senior
research executives in both the Western and the Japanese pharmaceutical industry during
winter 2006 and spring 2007. Specifically, each visit comprised of 2-hour interviews
with the head of Research/Drug Discovery (typically the Chief Scientific Officer) as well
as head of the target company's genomics research effort. These executives were
selected because they had an intimate knowledge of the research/drug discovery
operations of their firms-ranging from personnel, budgets, projects, corporate and
research history, and detailed technical knowledge-and were in positions of direct
responsibility.
In terms of the firms themselves, a small number of companies were selected as a
representative sample of the Western (defined as U.S.- and Europe-based) and the
Japanese pharmaceutical industry, respectively. Interviews were conducted at 4 major
pharmaceutical firms in the West and 5 major pharmaceutical firms in Japan. In the case
of the Western companies, two U.S.-based companies and two Europe-based companies
were chosen to represent the two different major geographic markets of the West. All
firms sampled are members of the world's top 50 pharmaceutical companies, as ranked
by Pharmaceutical Executive 's 2006 annual survey, and are industry leaders in both
domestic (top 25 ranking by market share and sales) and global markets. I selected this
specific pool of companies given the study's focus on the true pharmaceutical majors.
For the purposes of data analysis, 2 Western companies (one U.S.-based and one Europe-
based company) and 4 Japanese companies were selected as representative samples for
the two regions.
The aim of the personal interviews was to profile each company's genomics-
based efforts, specifically: 1) presence and investments in genomics-related research and
technologies; 2) resulting benefits and productivity due to genomics investment; 3) using
genomics as a lens to deconstruct the firm's 'serendipity' in drug discovery.
For the first area, the interview probed for the firm's initial entry into genomics.
The company's presence and/or investment in specific genomics-related technologies
was investigated. These included: knockouts and transgenic animal models,
pharmacogenomics/ADMET, antisense technology, bioinformatics, population/functional
genomics, structural genomics, chemical genomics, systems biology, genomics tools,
reference sets (cDNA, haplotypes, SNPs, small molecules, protein affinity reagents),
proteomics, metabonomics, automation, computational biology, DNA sequencing,
40 Conducted in either the corporate headquarters or research headquarters office of each pharmaceutical
company, in its home country. In two cases, teleconference was used due to scheduling difficulties.
robotics, and silicon chips & microarrays. In addition to identifying the source impetus
for genomics entry, the firm's evolution in the use of genomics was tracked.
For the second area, interviewees were asked to provide the benefits and/or output
from their firm's genomics investment. Though specific metrics such as the number of
resulting patents and publications were asked, interviewees were given an open-ended
opportunity to define their firm's productivity metric(s)-quantitative or qualitative. It
should be noted that due to perceived sensitivity of key output metrics, interviewees were
provided an opportunity to respond in numerical ranges, rather than precise figures.
For the third area, I asked the interviewees to provide greater clarity on their
firm's drug discovery efforts, both from a technology and an organizational perspective.
The strategies behind the research leadership's decision to pursue specific technologies or
organizational design was explored. The firm's genomics-based activities relative to this
framework was probed, to determine genomics' role within the company's research
organization.
Finally, it should be noted that in all interviews, interviewees were probed for a
deeper understanding of the answers put forward to the questions. Particular attention
was given to soliciting a full description (often historical) and rationale for key decisions
related to the firm's genomics-related activities.
4.2 Survey Questionnaire
In addition to the personal interviews, I constructed a survey questionnaire
specifically designed to probe the intangible, cultural aspects of a pharmaceutical
company's drug discovery efforts as it pertains to the firm's and its individual
researchers' national identity, ethnic/cultural attitudes, organizational memory, and
general self-identity. This survey was sent to the heads of research at each of the sample
firm (see above), who subsequently distributed this online questionnaire41 to their
respective senior research managers and staff. Since my desire was not to sensitize
respondents to Hypothesis II concerning the influence of national/ethnic identity on drug
discovery practices, questions were carefully worded and ordered so as to avoid an
apparent suggestion of causal effect. The full online Survey Questionnaire is attached
(Appendix 9.1).
The Survey Questionnaire served two additional purposes. Firstly, given its strict
assurances to the online respondent of confidentiality and complete anonymity-in
particular that no firm managers would receive or be able to view responses-the survey
helped mitigate respondents' otherwise concerns regarding politically acceptable
responses and 'face.' The distribution of this Questionnaire thus attempted to provide an
outlet of candor for the respondent, in a way that was unattainable during the face-to-face,
on-site, personal interviews. Secondly, by nature of its short-answer list of questions, the
Questionnaire aimed to secure both a larger sample size and uniformity of responses than
was possible with individual personal interviews.
41 Web URL was provided.
4.3 Testing the Hypotheses
To accept H1 I need to show the presence of a meaningful difference in the
strategy and evolution of technological investment and organizational design between
Western and Japanese pharmaceutical firms, using the lens of genomics. Since it is
difficult to measure serendipity directly, the two components of technology and
organizational design together serve as a proxy. It is differences in these two areas that
are used to account for differences in the "facilitation" of serendipity. It should be noted
that though idiosyncratic, firm-specific differences are expected between pharmaceutical
firms within a particular national domicile, if my conjecture is correct, a pattern of
general consistency between domestic firms can be discerned, and nation-specific
differences between the West and Japan should emerge. The data for testing this
hypothesis are sourced from the personal interviews.
To accept H2 I need to demonstrate the existence of a clear, systematic difference
in self-perception between researchers in Western vs. Japanese pharmaceutical firms.
Aside from idiosyncratic person-to-person variation, a consistent characterization of the
two different national cultures should be observable. A third respondent pool of Chinese
genomics and life science organizations and firms was also conducted in parallel, which
would be expected to generate a third, distinct national culture characterization unique
from the first two in comparison. (The business models of these entities, however, were
in not drug discovery and development per se since no domestic pharmaceutical majors
yet exist in China, but are believed to serve as a close potential approximation.)
Moreover, associated factors such as intrinsic culture attitudes and impact of
organizational memory (based on the firm's industrial history in its domicile country)
would also be apparent. The data for assessing this hypothesis are drawn from responses
from the Survey Questionnaire.
Given the intangible nature of the two hypotheses, as well as the small sample
size of firms and respondents, it is believed that obtaining findings of statistical
significance is both difficult and arguably not the best approach with which to draw
meaningful conclusions concerning the influence of national identity and culture on
pharmaceutical drug discovery practices. Furthermore, the extreme sensitivity cited by
executives with regard to sharing certain figures (e.g. number of NMEs, budget
allocations) and disease areas of interest (e.g. lead compounds) renders traditional
quantitative analysis difficult 42 and which would possibly otherwise be accorded excess
weight. Rather, the integrated profile of firms' genomics-related efforts should be
evaluated as a whole, with particular attention to the qualitative aspects of the firms'
history and evolution in this field.
42 Data provided by executives in selected cases, and withheld in others.
5. Results
5.1 Summary Profiles of Firm-Specific Investment in Genomics-Related Research,
with Resulting Output & Productivity
Below are summary profiles of the selected subset of pharmaceutical firms, based
on the personal interviews with senior research executives. As stated above, one U.S.-
based company and one Europe-based company were chosen to represent the West, and 4
Japanese companies were selected to represent the Japanese domestic pharmaceutical
industry. Certain data are disguised, modified, or omitted as appropriate in order to
preserve the confidentiality of key proprietary information, as requested by the firms'
senior executives. All names of individuals below are fictionalized, and any overlap with
the names of any real persons is completely unintentional.
USA1
Year of Entry into Genomics Technology: c. 1994, then 2001
Core Competency(s) in Genomics:
Initial: Informatics, genetics of gene expression/protein profiling
Later: Animal models/knockouts, transgenics, systems analysis, computational biology,
functional genomics
Future: RNA, systems analysis
Source of Impetus for Entry:
USAl 's entry into genomics was pioneered by a prominent geneticist within the
firm, circa 1994. This early endeavor experienced a lack of sufficient progress with
technologies lagging behind concepts, and faced costly RFLP technology which proved
practically unfeasible. Moreover, stated USAl's senior genomics executive Dr. John
Scully, a lack of organizational process foretold the effort's stall.
The company decided, however, to re-enter genomics in 2001-through an
acquisition of a genomics technology company-at the urging of Chief Scientific Officer
Dr. Norman Mulder. In one stroke, the company gained the ability to conduct gene
expression profiling on a large scale and bioinformatics capability. Dr. Scully stated that
this strategy allowed USAl to gain critical mass within genomics rapidly, versus an
internal development strategy that would be much slower given the company's relative
unfamiliarity in this technology.
Evolution of Genomics Technologies:
The company has since developed additional capabilities in computational
biology, systems analysis, and in functional genomics. Each additional technology has
been centralized around its 2001 acquisition-referred to as a "spokes in a wheel"
strategy-both capability-wise and geographically. USAl made a second acquisition of
an RNA-based technology company which will work in tandem with genomics
technologies, in 2006.
Finally, USA1 has explicitly avoided DNA sequencing. Knockout animals are
also outsourced.
Priority Disease Areas for Genomics:
Multiple; genomics permeates entire research organization and across all disease areas.
Key Organizational Design Features:
Disease franchise research distributed at worldwide research sites, but all servers, data,
and analyses are centralized in USAl 's primary genomics facility in the U.S. Preclinical
testing is conducted in USA's primary U.S. research facility.
Resulting Output/Productivity:
* The firm measures its genomics-based output in three ways: 1) number of novel
targets; 2) generation of biomarkers to optimize go/no-go decisions in the drug
development process; and 3) optimization and quality of leads.
* Dr. Scully stated that an equally important benefit was the intellectual stimulation and
discipline that genomic approaches instilled throughout the entire research
organization, which incorporated genomics into the discovery process.
* Another metric used to grade success was any improvement on the probability of
success for a Phase IIb to Phase III decision point. Should this transition point be
made more informed by investing in genomics in early discovery, considerable
development cost could be saved for the company.
* However, senior management reiterated its believe that an evaluation of value
extracted from USAl's genomics investment will require 5 to 7 years
* Annual benchmarks emphasize the number of novel targets identified; 3-5 year
objectives emphasize enhancing the probability of success
* These objectives determined by financial projections and historical attrition rates,
rather than scientific capability
* Exact numbers of identified targets and/or NMEs undisclosed
Genomics Research Headcount (FTEs):
Not available, given the wide permeation of genomics-related research activities
Annual Cost / Budget for Genomics:
While management declined to offer a specific figure, the budget dedicated to genomics
represents a "very significant" portion of USA I's total research expenditure.
Key Commentary:
* Acquisitive entry into genomics due to belief that "it is hard to build from scratch an
area that is transformational." Other drivers included acquisition of key intellectual
property assets and speed.
* Patents and publications track "vitality," not "success"
EUROPE1
Year of Entry into Genomics Technology: 1997-1998
Core Competency(s) in Genomics:
Initial: Functional genomics
Later: Knockouts, signaling pathways
Future: Systems biology
Source of Impetus for Entry:
EUROPE 1's entry into genomics was the result of the decision by the CEO-an
executive with tremendous background and interest in science-to enter this
revolutionary technology. Head of the company's science board Thomas Dorfmann was
placed in charge of this initiative. Leveraging a combination of internal efforts and
research collaborations, EUROPE1 successfully built core capabilities of knockouts and
model organisms as well as in functional genomics. The company strategy thus
eschewed an otherwise acquisition-based strategy.
Evolution of Genomics Technologies:
Subsequently, EUROPE 1 decided to build core capability in elucidating
fundamental signaling pathways. Said Dorfmann, this was the necessary "foundation to
tackle systems biology," the company's next phase within genomics. Systems biology
would inform researchers regarding the inter-pathway connectivity, dynamic feedback
mechanisms, and signaling networks behind key disease mechanisms. Overall, the
objective of the company's genomics efforts was to focus on the important aspects of
disease-related signaling pathways.
Priority Disease Areas for Genomics:
Multiple, since signaling inter-pathway networks are believed to transcend between
various (including unanticipatable and unexpected) disease areas.
Key Organizational Design Features:
Satellite research facilities worldwide focus on disease areas, but scientists in
EUROPE1 's primary research facility focus on platform technologies and functions.
Resulting Output/Productivity:
* EUROPE 's primary metric for genomics productivity is an intellectual property
portfolio of targets. While management declined to offer a specific figure, over 20
targets have been generated from the genomics investment.
* The firm's research organization has extracted significant "intangible value" from
genomics, including notably from its failures. EUROPE1 researchers conduct "post-
mortem analyses" to learn why specific signaling events fail. This is believed to
translate into faster cycle times, and more informed decisions.
Genomics Research Headcount (FTEs):
Not available
Annual Cost / Budget for Genomics:
While management declined to offer a specific figure, the budget dedicated to genomics
represents a greater portion of EUROPE l's total research expenditure on other
technologies, with the exception of stem cell research.
Key Commentary:
* "Genomics permeates everything."
* Rationale for company's large scale genomics investment: "If you want to do them
[genomics-based discovery and associate technologies] reliably, you must do them at
scale."
JAPAN1
Year of Entry into Genomics Technology: 1999
Core Competency(s) in Genomics:
Initial: transgenics, knockout technology
Later: proteomics, yeast genetics
Future: bioinformatics, pharmacogenomics
Source of Impetus for Entry:
In 1999, JAPAN 1's President initiated an effort to enter into genomics, granting
carte blanche to his Head of Research, Dr. Tetsuya Ohnishi. This began with the
founding of a gene-hunting technology laboratory. However, with the realization that
JAPAN1 could not follow the U.S.-which was involved in whole genome sequencing-
the company's efforts were thus 3 to 5 years behind. As a result, this gene-hunting effort
was abandoned, particularly since many knockouts were deemed limited due to lethality.
Evolution of Genomics Technologies:
JAPAN1 subsequently shifted its genomics effort to the testing reactivity of large
number of compounds for phenotypic determination. Dr. Ohnishi focused on
establishing a proteomics laboratory as well as the firm's yeast genetics research with the
aim of achieving knockouts for 6,000 genes, finding target candidates, and target
validation.
Dr. Ohnishi states JAPAN l's deliberate decision to outsource selected genomics
technologies. These include microarrays and knockout animal models.
Dr. Ohnishi expressed JAPAN I's apparent weakness in bioinformatics. The firm
also does not have any effort in systems biology.
Priority Disease Areas for Genomics:
Neurology, Oncology, Immunology
Key Organizational Design Features:
Primary genomics effort and team is based in the company's Japan facilities.
Resulting Output/Productivity:
Ohnishi cited difficulty in measuring acceleration of cycle time in drug discovery.
No NMEs generated from genomics to date. One to two compounds attributed to
genomics (activity detected). The company expects to conduct a review of productivity
in the 2010-2015 timeframe.
Genomics Research Headcount (FTEs):
30 (gene-hunting) + 100 (basic science) + 50
Annual Cost / Budget for Genomics:
$2 million
Key Commentary:
* U.S. is ahead in genomics by 3-5 years
* Post-World War II Japanese pharmaceutical culture is to follow U.S. leadership
* The U.S. National Institutes of Health grant system enables U.S. to maintain the #1
position in life sciences research
* Among genomics technologies, bioinformatics is Japan's Achilles Heel
JAPAN2
Year of Entry into Genomics Technology: 1998-1999
Core Competency(s) in Genomics:
Initial: DNA sequencing, proteomics, bioinformatics, knockouts
Later: Chemogenomics
Future: RNA, snRNA, safety concerns, drug delivery; strengthen bioinformatics
Source of Impetus for Entry:
JAPAN2's entry into genomics was the upshot of a formal committee decision in
1998. Then-head of research Kentaro Ibuki, considered internally to be a highly
prescient visionary, personally selected an elite group of 10 to 15 scientists to begin the
firm's genomics initiative. Focusing initially on DNA sequencing, microarrays,
bioinformatics, knockouts and pharmacogenomics, this group was given five years to
achieve results. The aim was to identify druggable genes for small molecules, preferably
within hyperlipidemia, diabetes, and cancer, though was not limited to any particular
therapeutic area. The team attained several early successes: mouse models, identification
of a candidate gene (in hyperlipidemia), and mouse homologues.
Evolution of Genomics Technologies:
In time, JAPAN2 began SNP typing in rheumatology and identified two candidate
genes, though lacked a disease model and phenotype. Another lead in diabetes from
expression profiling emerged, though identification of the natural ligand was problematic.
Both projects were terminated after 5 years.
The company also began a research collaboration with a major U.S.
biotechnology firm as a source of expression profiling and knockout animals.
Eventually, JAPAN2's genomics team switched from its initial objective of
identifying new genes to finding new targets. Chemogenomics was a primary method
used in this effort to identify targets based on selected compounds from an existing
internal library.
The objective of JAPAN2's genomics was threefold: 1) analyzing DNA
sequences; 2) identifying specific targets' activity; and 3) accelerating the drug discovery
process, leveraging genomics as a way to integrate critical biological information.
JAPAN2 currently outsources less costly technologies and invests in leading edge
technologies. The company also does not have any interest in establishing a genomics
laboratory outside Japan.
Priority Disease Areas for Genomics:
Hyperlipidemia, diabetes, cancer
Key Organizational Design Features:
* Strong group organizational ability and talent selection was attributed primarily to
research head Dr. Ibuki.
* Combination of 1-2 senior individuals who make all technology evaluations, but
consults with experts regarding specific technologies
* 50-60% of the firm's 'star scientists' are believed to be principal members of
JAPAN2's genomics initiative
* Firm's genomics effort is based entirely in Japan
Resulting Output/Productivity:
Several NCEs have been identified, of the G-protein coupled receptor family, anti-
microbials, extracellular targets for antibodies, and a possible monoclonal antibody. One
compound has successfully entered the preclinical testing stage. No metrics current exist
to track the change in attrition rate post the genomics investment.
Genomics Research Headcount (FTEs):
* 80 (one-third Ph.D.s); genomics group: time allocation (90%) mostly on conventional
technologies
* 15-20 in bioinformatics
Annual Cost / Budget for Genomics:
Within the first 2 years, budget was $250 million for the next 3 years (one-fifth of total
firm R&D spending).
Key Commentary:
* JAPAN2's company president is not interested in specific technologies per se, but is
only focused on improving research productivity.
* Genomics is "just one of many tools" in the company's repertoire of drug discovery
technologies
* 50-60% of the firm's 'star scientists' are believed to be principal members of
JAPAN2's genomics initiative
JAPAN3
Year of Entry into Genomics Technology: 1996
Core Competency(s) in Genomics:
Initial: cDNA, bioinformatics
Later: Knockouts, transgenics, databases
Future: Systems biology, biologics
Source of Impetus for Entry:
JAPAN3's entry into genomics was the result of a major collaboration
arrangement with a major Western pharmaceutical company in the late 1990s. First
proposed by the Vice President of Drug Discovery, the initial objective was to serve as a
tool for discovery, specifically to find new targets, use in target validation, and to
increase probability of success with new compounds. Head of Research Dr. Akira Hojo
stated that this effort met with early success with the finding of a novel G-protein coupled
receptor. JAPAN3 decided to focus its genomics endeavors on three core disease areas:
diabetes/cardiovascular, cancer, and CNS. The firm set an expected time horizon of
investment of 10 years.
Evolution of Genomics Technologies:
The firm has since expanded into all major genomics-related technologies, most
notably knockouts and transgenic animal models. JAPAN3 also has gained access to
databases (e.g. SNPs) through collaborations with U.S. and domestic entities.
Dr. Hojo stated that JAPAN3's strategy was to focus only on priority targets in its
top 3 therapeutic areas, given limited resources. Any unpursued candidates in other
therapeutic areas would be outlicensed to other firms.
Selected genomic technologies are strategically built internally, outsourced (e.g.
knockouts, transgenics), sourced through collaboration, or acquired through hiring of new
research staff.
The firm also has attention dedicated to genomics-based biologics, in oncology
and inflammation.
Priority Disease Areas for Genomics:
Metabolic disease/Diabetes/Cardiovascular, oncology, and CNS
Key Organizational Design Features:
* Prior to 2000, JAPAN3 did not prioritize its human resources in terms of the number
of genomics-related researchers. After 2000, Dr. Hojo decided to concentrate its
human capital on core projects within genomics, allocating more FTEs to priority
areas.
* The company has a program designed to send its scientists outside of the firm to
acquire critical training, particularly with regards to mastering platform technologies.
* Firm's genomics effort is based entirely in Japan
Resulting Output/Productivity:
* JAPAN3 set an implicit 10-year horizon for its first major evaluation of how
productive its investment in genomics has been. The firm's top two metrics are to:
increase the number of drug candidates and to reduce cycle time in early discovery.
* While management declined to offer a specific figure, approximately fewer than 10
candidates have been generated from the company's genomics efforts. All are
currently in pre-clinical testing.
Genomics Research Headcount (FTEs):
* While management declined to offer a specific figure, it is estimated that 100
researchers are dedicated to genomics-related research (principally pharmacologists
and molecular biologists).
Annual Cost / Budget for Genomics:
While management declined to offer a specific figure, it is estimated that a total of $80
million was dedicated to genomics, over a 10-year period.
Key Commentary:
* Results (benefit) from genomics has been "less than expectations"
* Time lag between target discovery to IND is longer with the firm's genomics-derived
targets than with conventional targets 43
JAPAN4
Year of Entry into Genomics Technology: 2000
Core Competency(s) in Genomics:
Initial: Bioinformatics, knockouts, transgenics, proteomics
Later: Pharmacogenomics, biomarkers, proteomics, metabolic/ADME
Future: sRNA, biologics (especially monoclonal antibodies), systems biology
Source of Impetus for Entry:
JAPAN4 entered genomics with the objective of discovering novel molecular
targets for innovative drugs and accelerating drug discovery, as proposed by the head of
drug discovery to the CEO. Prior to 2000, genomics was believed to lack sufficient
43 Approximately 45 to 50 months.
critical mass and would require heavy investment in order to be successful. Head of
research Dr. Chiaki Asami stated that the company's objective to was achieve results
within 5 years, which ultimately failed to materialize.
Evolution of Genomics Technologies:
Dr. Asami noted a shift in the firm's genomics strategy from searching for targets
by therapeutic areas to searching by both therapeutic areas and mechanisms of action.
The latter was broken into a 2-step approach of identifying targets by therapeutic areas,
then followed by elucidation of mechanisms of action and subsequent validation.
Selected genomics technologies are outsourced, including knockouts, transgenics,
and certain genomics-related computer technology. This allows conservation of
resources, space, and capacity.
JAPAN4 has focused on seeking targets in neurology and oncology, due to the
two disease areas' perceived large number of targets. Infectious disease, on the other
hand, is believed to have been exhausted.
Priority Disease Areas for Genomics:
Neurology, oncology, diabetes/cardiovascular
Key Organizational Design Features:
* 5% of total company research headcount outside Japan
* JAPAN4 expressed a strong preference for collaborations with other firms over
acquisitions or redeployment of researchers (including sending outside for training).
This strategy enables the firm to avoid loss of key resources, while also securing
product access
* Recent merger has accelerated desired buildup of size and coverage of therapeutic
areas, as well as expanding internal compound library
* Recognition of discovery success on individual and team levels
Resulting Output/Productivity:
* JAPAN4 set a 5-year window within which to achieve results. Dr. Asami defined the
metric of successful output from genomics to be the entry of a newly generated
compound into clinical testing.
* 2-3 compounds in preclinical testing stage (CNS, diabetes/cardiovascular)
* 5-10 compounds in lead optimization stage (diabetes, CNS, urology, inflammation)
* An unspecified number of additional compounds in lead generation stage
* One in clinical trials (oncology)
* Over 20 patents from genomics (-5-10 per year)
* Still too early to ascertain role of genomics in reducing attrition rates
Genomics Research Headcount (FTEs):
Not available
Annual Cost / Budget for Genomics:
Approximately $10 to $20 million annually, from 2000-2003
Key Commentary:
* Time lag between target discovery to IND is longer with the firm's genomics-derived
targets (3-4 years) than with conventional targets (1-5 years). While the latter is more
variable in time, it has historically been shorter.
* Identification of natural ligand believed to be critical bottleneck, along with target
validation
5.2 Comparison between the West and Japan
It is difficult to draw conclusive observations on the differences between Western
versus Japanese pharmaceutical companies due to the small sample size. However, there
are several interesting and discernible disparities between the two groups that shed light
on how differences in the pattern of technological investment and organizational design
may lead to differences in the "facilitation" of serendipity between Western and Japanese
firms (H1).
From the profiles, it can be observed that while inter-firm differences appear to
exist between the Western pharmaceutical firms (U.S.-based and Europe-based firms),
there is an overall consistency characterizing this group of firms. Similarly, a pattern of
consistency is apparent from the Japanese firms, despite intra-group variations. Several
key differences between these two groups are both evident and significant.
On the technology end, the Western pharmaceutical majors entered genomics
technology (circa mid- 1990s) just slightly earlier than their Japanese counterparts (late
1990s up to 2000). Though USA1 re-entered genomics following its aborted initial
investment in 1994 and EUROPE 1 formally entered genomics in 1997, both firms
reported early unofficial explorations with this technology. The chosen entree sub-
technology was informatics and functional genomics, as these firms attempted to deploy
large-scale computational methods against their already extant genome databases, to
inform biological understanding. By contrast, firms such as JAPAN2 readily entered
DNA sequencing, bioinformatics, and knockout technology nearly simultaneously from
inception. Much of the early attention, however, focused on the development of
knockout models, given senior research executives' perception of a straightforward path
to 'gene-hunting'. Thus, the two sets appeared to be grounded in different roots.
Interestingly, the Western companies also made the deliberate decision of eschewing
activities involving raw DNA sequencing.
It is important to point out that while the two groups of firms shared some initial
overlap in bioinformatics investment, a vast discrepancy in scale actually existed. From
the sample profiles of Japan pharmaceutical firms above, the largest budget allocated to
all genomics technologies was JAPAN2's investment of approximately $250 million for
use over a 3-year period (equivalent to -$80 million per year). This amount represented
one-fifth of the firm's total R&D spending. In comparison, while management at USAl
and EUROPE1 declined to offer specific dollar amounts, executives confirmed that the
amount invested in genomics per year represented a greater portion of total research
expenditure than that spent on other platform technologies. Both the average Japanese
and Western pharmaceutical majors spend approximately 16-17% of total sales on R&D.
However, when one considers that Takeda, Japan's largest domestic pharmaceutical firm,
reported $10.4 billion in 2006 sales and that Pfizer, the West's largest pharmaceutical
firm, reported $48.4 billion for the same period, it becomes apparent that each percentage
point of R&D spending in the Western and in the Japanese firms actually represents a
substantial difference in magnitude of drug discovery spending.44 If one assumes roughly
equivalent diversification of drug discovery platform technologies between the two sets,
given the assumptions above, one can deduce the average genomics budget in the
Western majors to be nearly $2 billion-a clear order of magnitude above the genomics
spending of the Japanese majors. The implication is that Western firms' superiority of
scale enables large-scale investment in scale-intensive efforts (such as bioinformatics) in
turn, and affords greater latitude in both diversification into genomic sub-technologies
and costlier ventures.
The benefits of superior size also confers additional advantages. USAl's strategy
of entering genomics via a technology company acquisition exemplifies the Western
majors' more aggressive style. Though EUROPE 1 alternatively relied organic efforts
and external collaborations, it rapidly built a network of alliances with key leading
technology firms. Beyond the availability of greater financial resources, these more
aggressive approaches enabled Western firms to pursue the application of genomics in
multiple disease areas, versus the two to three priority areas targeted by each Japanese
pharmaceutical firm. Moreover, the Western firms have rapidly adopted leading-edge
genomics-related emerging technologies, such as USAl's acquisition of a RNA
technology firm.
Another key difference with regard to technology is the evolution of the two sets
of firms with genomics sub-technologies. The Western firms expressed an unequivocal
aspiration towards the integration of signaling networks and disease pathways: systems
biology. Foreseeing this eventuality, these firms have invested considerable capital as
well as time to ensure genomics is accorded a substantial proportion of total research
spending. USA1, for example, has centralized all discovery platform technologies
around its genomics base. Interestingly, three of the Japanese firms stated a desire to
develop systems biology expertise, though trail the Western firms (see below).
On the organizational design end, distinct differences between the two sets of
firms also exist. Both USAl and EUROPEl expressed a strong appreciation of the
'intangible value' of genomics, beyond generating new lead compounds and targets.
While all four Japanese firms in this study expressed similar sentiments, the Western
companies pointed toward the true integration and 'permeation' of genomics technology
44 The sample calculation here is used to illustrate an average Japanese pharmaceutical firm's R&D
spending on the order of $1.6 billion per year, while the average Western pharmaceutical firm would have
spent $9.6 billion. This represents an approximate 6-fold difference in R&D spending. Note that R&D
spending includes expenditures on both drug discovery research and clinical development.
throughout the entire drug discovery organization. As mentioned above, USAl
restructured its organization into a 'spokes in a wheel' arrangement, whereby all platform
technologies were centralized around the genomics-based core--both capability-wise and
geographically. EUROPE1 conducted 'post-mortem analyses' of failed genomics
projects to maximize process learning. The Japanese firms, on the other hand,
consistently appear to view genomics as 'just one of many tools' in the drug discovery
technology toolbox, and which does not play a central, pivotal role. Genomics is looked
upon skeptically by senior research scientists who remain uncertain of its true value,
particularly given the Japanese firms' stated view that the time lag between target
discovery to IND is longer with genomics-derived targets (3-4 years) than with
conventional targets (1-5 years)4 . Even the difference in full-time equivalents (FTEs) of
dedicated genomics headcount between the two sets of firms is notable, given the
divergent views and discrepancy in resources.
Despite the differences between Western and Japanese pharmaceutical firms,
however, numerous similarities also exist. From the profiles, it is uniformly observed
that the genomics investment of both sets of firms are entirely resided within the borders
of the companies' domicile countries-most typically located at the research
organizations' main facilities. Despite the worldwide research sites of these global
players, dedicated genomics equipment, infrastructure, and headcount are all domiciled
within or proximal to corporate research headquarters, suggesting a desire to maintain
close oversight, and direct and centralized management of this novel platform technology.
It is also possible that firms desire to exert greater influence over the day-to-day
development and maturation-much of it based on trial-and-error--of a multidisciplinary
technology such as genomics. Moreover, geographical placement of genomics research
adjacent to the company's conventional discovery technologies likely facilitates
interaction between the two groups and encourages organizational assimilation of
genomics as a core pillar of drug discovery-particularly with the Western firms that
have centered genomics as the new heart of their drug discovery technologies.
Other similarities include surprising parallels in the evolutionary history of
genomics investment. In nearly all cases, the driver behind genomics investment
originated from one individual, principally a top distinguished scientist recognized by
both the research organization and senior executive management. Interestingly, the
Presidents/CEOs of both Western and Japanese pharmaceutical firms generally lacked
scientific familiarity with individual technologies such as genomics, and instead
conferred wide discretionary power to this top scientist, who in most cases was elevated
to Chief Scientific Officer or Head of Drug Discovery status.46 This individual was
hence entrusted with all decisions related to allocation between technologies,
organizational design thereof, and human resource management. Other observations
include: similar decisions to establish collaborations with U.S. genomic technology
companies, the outsourcing of cost-intensive technologies such as knockout animals, and
45 While this 1-5 year period is more variable, it has historically been shorter than longer.
46 Two notable exceptions include the CEO of EUROPE 1, a scientifically trained executive who was the
driver for the firm's genomics entry, and the Chairman of JAPAN4, a prominent researcher who rose from
drug discovery to commercial executive leadership.
a surprising approximate convergence of priority therapeutic areas targeted by the
genomics investments (e.g. neurology, oncology, cardiovascular/diabetes). Most of all,
all firms surveyed demonstrated a dynamic, continual evolution in their genomics
strategy, entering/exiting selected sub-technologies and building core capability in others.
No firm reported a state of constancy.
Lastly, the two sets of firms share the same likeness with regard to the result of
their investment in genomics. Both the Western and Japanese majors shared the belief
that while a certain number of targets have been successfully identified and lead
compounds generated, it remained too early to conduct a productivity assessment of the
value of genomics-related technologies. Given the initial entries began in the mid-to-late
1990s, nearly all expressed a belief that a more definitive determination will not be
available until 15 years after this decision point. In accordance with this view, no
quantifiable metrics on reduction of cycle times or improvement of attrition rates have
been successfully reported,
As a final comment, it is believed that patents and publications serve as poor
metrics for this study since virtually all firms surveyed here stated that both types of
filings were pursued only after the discovery and validation of a new target; since firms'
genomics investment were primarily launched in the late 1990s with resulting new leads
(especially in small numbers) emerging only in the recent 1-2 years, the necessary lag
period has led to a scarcity of filings in the current literature. Thus, examination of
patents and publications was not considered an important indicator of success in
productivity for this study.
5.3 Survey Questionnaire Findings
Data from the three respondent pools of Western and Japanese pharmaceutical
majors, and Chinese genomics/life science organizations and firms were collected.
Given the small sample sizes of questionnaire respondents (Western: n= 18, Japanese:
n=13, and Chinese: n = 10, where n = number of individual respondents from companies
representing each of the three countries' pharmaceutical industries), these data are not
statistically significant. Nevertheless, the data (based on numerical-based questions and
text-response questions) yield meaningful and highly informative findings in which a
clear, distinctive national culture characterization emerges for each of the three datasets.
(See Appendix 9.2 for detailed summary of data acquired from Survey Questionnaire
respondents).
Western
Based on respondents from the three datasets, the average age of genomics/life
sciences researchers was highest in the Western pharmaceutical majors (50.3 years).
From a firm tenure perspective, Western researchers averaged 11.3 years with their firm,
the second longest in this survey. Researchers also cited the largest number of MD-
PhD's of the three groups, representing nearly half (44%) of all reporting Western
scientists.
In terms of self-identity and self-perception, a coherent picture emerges. When
asked to characterize their individual nationality/ethnicity/cultural identity, Western
researchers tended to report their individual country nationalities or their race (See text-
based responses, Appendix 9.2). When asked to describe the nationality of their
company, however, 55% of these respondents either characterized their firms as
'Western' or a 'Combination of several national cultures' (a proxy for multinational firm);
the one significant exception was that U.S.-based respondents tended to characterize their
firms as 'American' (Figure 2). Together, these data suggest that there exists a
dichotomy of self-perception within Western pharmaceutical firms: Europe-based MNCs
view themselves as a medley of various national cultures, while U.S.-based companies
view them as distinctly American. Moreover, with this exception, researchers appeared
to identify with a multinational identity, though retained country identification on an
individual level.
Question 7 How would you describe the
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Figure 2.
On the individual level, other notable trends emerge. One-hundred percent of
Western respondents reported domestic university and scientific training, with none
reported foreign university training (or both). With respect to key factors for driving
personal performance, Western researchers were surprisingly the only group to cite
'loyalty to company' (33%) as a motivator, along with 'contribution to society' (33%),
'self-achievement' (23%), and 'commitment to industry' (11%). All respondents
reported the existence of 'star scientists' within their firms, with the highest proportion
(67%) specifying a number of 'Over 15' star scientists, among the three datasets (Figures
3 and 4). Frequency of interaction with these star scientists was also greatest (3.3x per
week) when compared against that reported by Japanese and Chinese researchers.
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Figures 3 and 4.
On the firm level, Western respondents exhibited a keen sense of the length of
their organizations' corporate histories (67% reported '100+ years', 33% reported '50-
100 years') (Figure 5).
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Figure 5.
Respondents expressed a high perceived level of receptivity to new ideas by senior
management (22% very receptive, 78% receptive). Interestingly, this receptivity was
particularly higher for genomics technology, where 89% responded 'very receptive'. The
source of greatest resistance cited was 'organization culture'; text-based responses
described the disadvantages of the firms' long corporate history, including "institutions of
process ossified" and "risk averse culture from way back" (Figure 6). Additionally, both
'peers/colleagues' (22%) and 'subordinates' (17%) were also cited as sources of
resistance.
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Other key observations include respondent perceptions of their firms' internal processes,
projection timeframe, and external relationships. Of the 3 groups, Western respondents
ranked their firms as the most aggressive in decision-making when pursuing new
technologies or new fields, at a 7.8 on a scale of 1 (not aggressive) to 10 (extremely
aggressive). Compared against their Japanese and Chinese counterparts, Western
researchers also assigned the highest weight (56% of Western respondents) to long-term
future orientation (i.e. beyond 5 years) when considering critical decisions. Also reported
was the highest level of cross-functional team activity (67%) and a large number of
interactions with 3rd party researchers. Quite interesting is the Western researchers'
perception of the most important source of creativity in drug discovery: middle
management and general staff, which together comprised 89% of novel ideas, suggesting
the sourcing of key ideas from internal performers within the company (Figure 7). This
and other data are more readily intriguing when compared against that of Japanese and
Chinese firms (see below).
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Japanese
On the whole, the data from Japanese respondents closely approximated that of
Western researchers. Japanese researchers ranked the second highest average age (45.3
years old) of the 3 groups, but held the longest average tenure with their firms (15.5
years). These researchers were mostly comprised of Ph.D.'s (85%), the largest
proportion among the 3 datasets.
: Western
,0 Japanese
0i Chinese
In terms of self-identity and self-perception, this group overwhelmingly declared
their Japanese nationality (85%), higher than any other group (Figure 2). This self-
identification is more pronounced when considering the text-responses which included
statements such as "100% Japanese" and suggests a strong sense of national pride on the
part of Japanese researchers and pharmaceutical majors.
On an individual level, Japanese respondents begin to diverge more from their
Western counterparts. Respondents were roughly split equally between those trained in
domestic university and those trained in both domestic and foreign universities and
institutions; this latter group (54%) was the largest proportion among the 3 datasets.
Respondents cited 'commitment to industry' (31%) and 'personal goals' (23%) as the top
two driving factors for performance; surprisingly, no respondents selected 'loyalty to
company' as a primary factor of motivation. Only slightly more than one-third of
respondents suggested the existence of star scientists within their firms (36%); almost
one-half reported the absence of any star scientists (46%), and 15% reported 'I don't
know' (Figure 3). Of those who reported the existence of star scientists, a vast majority
(77%) reported a number of only 0 to 5, a figure significantly lower than that of the
Western respondents, who skewed the opposite (higher) end of the scale (Figure 4).
Level of frequent interaction with these scientists was also reported at a moderate 1.0x
per week, lower than that reported by Western respondents. Interestingly, however,
based on the solicited text-based response for a 'star scientist' definition, both Western
and Japanese researchers reported a highly similar profile: individuals who are
internationally recognized in their research, has published in top scientific journals such
as Nature and Science, have validated key discoveries, and originated novel ideas.
Together, these data suggest that the driving force for innovation within Western and
Japanese pharmaceutical firms may differ, with the latter perhaps relying less on the
contribution of individual top performers ('stars') and relying more greatly on team
performance.
On a firm level, Japanese respondents revealed precise awareness of their
companies' corporate histories. Figure 5 shows a rough bimodal distribution of firms
with 50-100+ years of history and firms with histories less than 25 years. This quite
accurately reflects the true nature of the Japanese firms surveyed in this study-as well as
the domestic Japanese pharmaceutical majors in general-which all nearly comprise of
century-old firms, some of which have undergone mergers in the past decade to form
newly combined entities.
Respondents expressed a high perceived level of receptivity to new ideas by
senior management (8% very receptive, 62% receptive), somewhat lower than the level
reported by Western researchers. An interesting and consistent observation is that this
receptivity was also particularly higher for genomics technology, where 23% responded
'very receptive' and 54% reported 'receptive', suggesting a shift similar to that seen with
Western respondents. Also similar in this regard was the source of greatest resistance to
new technologies cited: 'organization culture' (46%), likely the result of the firms' long
corporate history, as with the Western pharmaceutical majors. That both 'finance' (23%)
and 'senior management' (15%) were also cited as sources of resistance is a key
difference from the West, which noted 'peers/colleagues' and 'subordinates' as the
second and third greatest sources of resistance. This suggests a critical difference: in
addition to the common denominator of challenges of organizational culture, Western
firms face organizational resistance at the middle management level, while Japanese
firms may face organizational resistance at the senior management level or with regard to
securing the necessary financing (Figure 6).
Other key observations include respondent perceptions of their firms' internal
processes, projection timeframe, and external relationships. Of the 3 groups, Japanese
firms appear to be the least aggressive in decision-making when pursuing new
technologies or new fields, at a 4.6 on a scale of 1 (not aggressive) to 10 (extremely
aggressive). Japanese researchers also assigned a substantially greater weight (62%) to
short-term, immediate orientation (i.e. 1-5 years) when considering critical decisions-
defying expectations. Also reported was the second highest level of cross-functional team
activity and a high level of interaction with 3 rd party researchers. Quite interesting is the
consistency here between Western and Japanese researchers' perception of the most
important source of creativity in drug discovery: middle management and general staff,
which together comprised 62% of novel ideas, suggesting the sourcing of key ideas from
internal performers within the company (Figure 7). This last point differs substantially
when compared against Chinese firms (see below).
Chinese
Data collected from the Chinese respondents diverged most from that of Western
and Japanese respondents. Chinese respondents had the lowest average age of the 3 data
sets, at 33.0 years of age, and held the shortest average firm tenure at a meager 1.4
years-an order of magnitude less than their Western and Japanese counterparts and
likely attributable to the fact that the genomics and life sciences companies both in China
and surveyed in this study are recently formed entities generally with less than 2 years of
existence. Chinese researchers also appeared to be divided equally by advanced degree,
into MD and Ph.D. backgrounds.
In terms of self-identity and self-perception, 60% of respondents self-identified
their firms as Chinese, while 40% described their organizations as 'Asian' (Figure 2).
Responses to the text-based question in this line of questioning described their entities
consistent with "a newborn alliance of several companies", "energetic youngers", and
firms who aspire to "make its best to be known by others all over the world". These
respondents demonstrate Chinese firms' keen eagerness to gain scale and recognition
abroad (Appendix 9.2).
On an individual level, responses were also markedly different from that of the
West and Japan. Chinese respondents boasted the largest number of solely foreign
University trained scientists-notably lacking among the Western and Japanese
researchers surveyed. Importantly, in terms of key factors driving performance, 'self-
achievement' (50%) represented the primary motivating factor, the highest proportion
reported among the 3 groups; 'commitment to industry' represented the remaining 40%.
Interestingly, virtually all (90%) of respondents appeared to reject the existence of star
scientists in their organizations, which is highly suggestive of egalitarian undertones
(Figures 3 and 4). Nonetheless, when asked to define the profile of a 'star scientist',
Chinese respondents provided a definition entirely consistent with that given by Western
and Japanese respondents.
On the firm level, Chinese respondents reported initially consistent findings with
their Western and Japanese counterparts. For example, Chinese researchers expressed a
high perceived level of receptivity to new ideas by senior management (100% receptive),
which came out the highest proportion of the 3 datasets. The consistent observation that
this receptivity was scored higher for genomics technology continues to hold true even
with the Chinese, where 50% responded 'very receptive' and 50% reported 'receptive',
suggesting a similar shift upward.
Further results on the firm level, however, yielded the most revealing findings.
Unlike Western and Japanese researchers, all Chinese respondents cited organizational
histories for their firms of 0 to 25 years (Figure 5). Particularly intriguing are the
provided sources of greatest resistance to new technologies: 40% cited 'finance' and 50%
indicated the absence of any resistance to technology adoption (Figure 6). These data
clearly continue to support the view of young, highly ambitious, and aggressive entities
bent on entrepreneurial growth, bounded only by the capital constraints of new start-up
ventures-much unlike the established pharmaceutical majors of the West and Japan
whose market capitalizations are on the order of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars.
Accordingly, Chinese firms ranked second in aggressiveness in decision-making, scoring
6.5, behind that given by Western respondents. All Chinese respondents also uniformly
cited a short-term, immediate orientation (1-5 year timeframe) in making critical
decisions, suggesting an complete absence of attention placed on long-term strategy and
instead a reliance on adaptive measures to the whims of the marketplace. Researchers
also reported the lowest frequency level of cross-functional team activity ('several times
per month', 60% and 'several times per week, 40%) relative to the two other datasets.
Most exceptional of all is the Chinese respondents' perception of the most important
source of creativity in research/drug discovery: foreign competitor firms (90%), a factor
completely uncited by either Western or Japanese pharmaceutical respondents (Figure 7).
It is this finding that I believe is potentially the most concerning as it suggests the greatest
potential source of weakness of Chinese life science entities.
In summary, three coherent and distinctive national culture characterizations of the
Western and Japanese pharmaceutical majors, and the budding Chinese genomics & life
sciences firms have been observed. For the Western majors, a picture of established
firms with core strengths in decisiveness, long-term vision, and an ability to merge novel
technologies with traditional technologies is delineated. These firms' corporate histories
provide lucid mission guidance, a plethora of capital, and deep-seeded institutional
knowledge-however is also necessarily accompanied by risk-averse organizational
culture and bureaucracy. For the Japanese majors, so fundamental and deep-rooted is a
sense of profound national pride that it pervades all aspects of the organization including
the basis of its core competencies in drug discovery: promptness, accuracy, and
originality. Though these firms remain grounded in traditional technologies such as
medicinal chemistry, researchers strive to integrate new emerging technologies to supply
best-in-class products. Corporate history is another key source of pride, which provides
direction and substantial capital resources, though somewhat less than their Western
competitors. As such, as shown in the data above, recent M&A activity has been
perceived favorably-rather than compounding firms' bureaucracy-bolstering disease
areas and expanding compound libraries and capacity. Finally, for the emerging Chinese
genomics and life sciences companies, a highly consistent image of eagerly energetic,
aggressive, and ambitious researcher-entrepreneurs with keen aspirations for international
recognition. These entities view their lack of corporate histories as an advantage rather
than the opposite, allowing freedom from otherwise institutional burdens. For the time
being, core competencies range from low cost to selected life science research services
(see Discussion below).
The influence of such national identity, cultural attitudes, organizational memory,
and corporate history on the respective firms' research practices has thus been shown.
Though it has not been demonstrated directly, such influences will no doubt translate into
distinctive impacts, in turn, on research and drug discovery productivity.
6. Discussion
6.1 Major Conclusions
The serendipity in drug discovery question is one that many major pharmaceutical
companies in the world have attempted to solve. It seems reasonably apparent that
serendipity is likely the result of some yet unidentified organizational aspect or
technology, or possibly both. That the inherently different national cultures of the West
and Japan would necessarily lead to differences in the facilitation of serendipity appears
quite likely.
The results reported here show that while the two share many similarities (see
above), Western firms exercised a characteristically different strategy from Japanese
firms with regards to their investment in genomics. Interestingly, during the personal
interviews, several Japanese senior executives openly conceded that Japan
pharmaceutical majors often reflected a follower mentality of the U.S. leadership in the
field of genomics-the product of the pioneering science of the well-financed National
Institutes of Health and the aggressive strategy of the Western pharmaceutical majors.
Indeed, the data readily show the benefits of superior scale and capitalization: enabling
the translation of aggressive strategy into action (e.g. acquisitions, entry into new
technologies); integration across functions and technologies (e.g. systems biology); first-
mover advantage (i.e. ability to enter into new fields earlier than competitors, thereby
acquiring experiential knowledge earlier); diversification to spread risk across different
bets (e.g. different platform technologies); diversification to spread wins (e.g. different
therapeutic areas); and freedom from resource constraints would engender conditions
optimal for greater appreciation of the intangible value of key novel technologies such as
genomics, to allow for true integration and "permeation" throughout the research
organization.
It is therefore no doubt that this rationale has prompted the recent flurry of M&A
activity among the top Japanese pharmaceutical companies: the product of these mega-
mergers-including the formation of Astellas and Daiichi-Sankyo, both in 2005-viewed
these combinations as a way to expand critical scale in market capitalization, in financial
and human resources, and in compound libraries and capacity.
Yet Japanese pharmaceutical firms appear to possess several hidden fortes. While
the Western firms boast numerous generated leads and targets through genomics
compared against the handful generated by Japanese firms, 47 it is interesting to note that
the link between drug discovery spending and lead compounds identified is not a
proportional increase. If one assumes that Western firms in fact outspend Japanese firms
in research expenditure by an order of magnitude (as discussed above), this suggests that
Japanese firms are significantly more efficient with both research dollars spent and
dedicated headcount. This higher level of efficiency will likely serve as a key source of
competitive advantage, particularly as the Japanese pharmaceutical majors strengthen
47 This refers to output (e.g. leads, targets) solely attributable to genomics, and not to other technology(s).
their presence in the U.S. market, where the Western majors have hit diminishing returns
with each incremental research dollar spent on either new technologies or researchers.
I believe that in particular, the importance of the prominent Japanese self-
identification that emerged from this study should be underscored. More so than their
Western and Chinese counterparts, the Japanese respondents surveyed here exhibited a
strong sense of Japanese solidarity-an exceptional pride of their national heritage and
ethnic identity. Despite slightly trailing the West in terms of depth and breadth of
genomics investment, Japanese researchers' uniform national identification likely
enabled domestic industry to remain independent Japanese entities that will continue their
century-long legacies. Such a firm sense of pride may also explain Japanese researchers'
attribution of new ideas and scientific leadership to internal talent (in the form of middle
management and general research staff).
From this perspective, in some respects Chinese genomics/life sciences firms can
be considered to be an antithesis of the Japanese pharmaceutical model. Emphasizing
entrepreneurial drive over national identity and short-term over long-term strategy,
researchers from these burgeoning entities attributed foreign competitor firms as their
primary source of creativity and new ideas. While a few of these approaches are of merit,
I believe several fundamental learnings from this genomics-based study can be applied to
these Chinese entities, if they indeed aspire to achieve the scale and might of the Western
or Japanese pharmaceutical majors.
One final comment before I proceed to prescriptive recommendations for China:
though the serendipity question will probably continue its black-box status in the near
future (especially since genomics has yet to mature), a greater awareness of the influence
of firms' and researchers' national identity, intrinsic cultural attitudes, organizational
memory and corporate history on drug discovery practices and productivity can only
serve to bring greater clarity to those characteristics that 'facilitate' serendipity in drug
discovery. Given the differential national culture characteristics of Western, Japanese,
and Chinese firms, each will encounter differential stresses in terms of technology,
organization, human capital, and financial resources. It is incumbent upon these firms to
recognize their respective strengths and deficiencies-as a result of their national
identities-and thus maximize and compensate for these accordingly.
6.2 Prescriptive Recommendations for China
In addition to my field research conducted at selected Western and Japanese
pharmaceutical companies, my research also visited a representative number of Chinese
genomics and life sciences organizations. From the separate data gathered during but not
reported in this study, discussions with these Chinese entities revealed a unique
arrangement whereby entities with different functional specializations were linked
together into a web of member organizations. Individual entities 48 -comprising both for-
profit firms and government-funded research-oriented organizations-were required to
contribute annual 'membership fees' to join this one-stop shop family. While certain
48 Several have origins as state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
member entities focused on core genomics sequencing, other members emphasized
functionalities ranging from microbiology to biomarker discovery and validation. The
one common denominator between these member entities, however, was a focus on
technology platforms, which translated into a business model based on providing life
sciences services to biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms engaged in drug
development.
My assessment of this operating model leads to a sharp dichotomy of views. On
the one hand, certain basic science entities such as the genomics organizations have
achieved true milestones of success-notably the completion of the sequencing of 1% of
the human genome and the indica rice genome-demonstrating powerful genomic
capabilities that rival that of the U.S. and Japan. These entities have chosen to develop
services and diagnostics based on this core capability in part to finance future scientific
and research endeavors and partly for applications into agriculture and other fields-an
approach which is understandably logical. On the other hand, less understandably so are
the member entities that aspire to concentrate on refining a portfolio of outsourced
services for the benefit of drug development companies-many of which are foreign
MNCs. Offering services such as target validation, screening for hits, lead optimization,
chemical and other preclinical analyses, leaders of these firms expressed their primary
intent to establish a reputation based on client trust. Given that these domestic and
foreign company clients' main concern is the protection of intellectual property, these
Chinese entities aspire to develop a reputation of confidentiality, quality, and promptness.
My objection to this latter business model is based on the belief that it is fundamentally
flawed insofar as that it is a thoroughly subservient business strategy. Nowhere was it
expressed that these firms aspired to conduct basic drug discovery and development, the
basic premise of the Western and Japanese pharmaceutical majors as well as the seat of
most of the core value in the pharmaceutical market. Likewise, these firms expressed the
specific objective of enhancing their outsourced services model and a deliberate intention
not to climb the pharmaceutical value chain--even as a long-term strategy toward which
the service model could serve as a short-term bridge.
Based on the learnings from the assessment of Western and Japanese
pharmaceutical majors discussed earlier in this study, I believe several salient prescriptive
recommendations for Chinese life sciences firms can be suggested. As with both the
West and Japan, the building of a domestic industrial drug development infrastructure
and capability is paramount. While the Chinese sense of 'energy' (see above) and
'hungry' aspiration to gain international recognition is commendable, the construction of
a solid domestic pharmaceutical industry must proceed before going global-much as
was the case with both Western and Japanese firms. Certainly the immense advantages
conferred by scale have been demonstrated in this study; the Chinese firms' attempt to
emulate this has been to establish a multi-entity organization of platform-based firms that
together offer a 'portfolio' of services to clients. Rather than this hodgepodge of
provided services, however, a better strategy may be to build a centralized, drug
discovery organization with many technology and functional capabilities, resembling the
separated-but-integrated departments of medicinal chemistry, crystallography, genomics
and others that reside within the world's leading pharmaceutical companies. Such a
strategy would avoid the piecemeal service-oriented model that is inherently limited in
revenue generation, and alternatively concentrate on high value, patent-protected drug
therapeutics for a global market-i.e. a move up the value chain. Interesting4ly, this is
similar to the strategy current being pursued by Indian pharmaceutical firms : moving
away from a highly fragmented generic-based industry with core capabilities in reverse
engineering and API manufacturing to producing specialty products for smaller patient
populations, and ultimately to R&D-based drug development. 50
Most critical of all is that these Chinese entities 1) maintain their status as
independent, domestically controlled firms, and 2) maintain a strong national culture
identity. As has been shown, the retention of a pharmaceutical firm's sense of national
pride is a key source of motivation, a compounding legacy passed on through a firm's
corporate history and organizational memory. As best demonstrated by the Japanese
pharmaceutical majors, the coupling of novel idea generation from internal talent and
drawing of research insights from foreign, Western competitors may be a good recipe for
success. Chinese life sciences firms should seek to establish research collaborations with
the West and remain competitive on new technology and organizational trends, but not at
the cost of over-reliance on or automatic deferral to foreign competitor firms as the
primary source of new ideas in drug discovery. Rather, these core capabilities should
remain internally generated by internal leaders.
6.3 Limitations & Further Work
There are many limitations to my research. It is not a complete survey of all
major pharmaceutical firms in the West or Japan, nor the genomics/life sciences firms in
China. The basis of initial selection for the 2 selected Western firms, 4 Japanese firms,
and 2 Chinese entities was based on a chosen representative sample as constrained by
budget, field research schedule, as well as the receptiveness of key firms of interest to
this research study and their senior executives' availability. A more complete analysis
would have covered more firms in each of the three respective countries.
There are limitations regarding this study's ability to measure 'serendipity' in
drug discovery (H1) and drug discovery productivity (H2). Much of the causative effects
presupposed in both hypotheses was here only measured by proxy, qualitatively, or by
indirect implication. Further studies using more definitive and quantifiable metrics to
study these relationships would be very valuable.
49 Including Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd., and Cipla Ltd.
0o A commonly stated strategy here articulated by Smith Barney. Many large Indian pharmaceutical firms
announced the acquisitions of foreign drug companies in 2004 and 2005 to gain expertise in R&D-based
drug innovation. Example deals include Matrix Laboratories' purchase of Belgium's DocPharma NV
($263 million, 22% stake), Malladi Drug & Pharmaceuticals Ltd.'s purchase of U.S.-based Novus Fine
Chemicals LLC ($25 million), Dr. Reddy's Laboratories' purchase of U.S.-based Trigenesis Therapeutics
($11 million), and Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd.'s acquisition of Germany-based Heumann Pharma GmbH
& Co. Generica KG (a Pfizer subsidiary with $60 million in annual revenues).
With regard to data, there are substantial limitations due to 1) qualitative nature of
the personal interviews with senior executives and 2) the limited quantitative data
acquired through the Interviews and the Survey Questionnaire. Both were not possible to
conduct statistical analyses due to small sample sizes or incomplete data (selectively
provided and omitted by executives). In particular, data for the distributed online
Questionnaire was difficult to solicit, possibly due to respondent concerns about time
investment, confidentiality, or lack of personal gain. As such, actual survey respondents
may have been subject to selection bias and in turn provided disproportionate
representation by their specific function, experiences, seniority level, attitudes and/or
other factors. Of course, it is also possible that respondents may have placed a politically
acceptable face or perspective on submitted responses-particularly those employees in
Asian organizations.
Finally, this study used genomics as a lens to examine pharmaceutical drug
discovery practices and the impact of national/ethnic identity. Further studies using more
traditional technologies may shed additional light, given their lengthier history, more
readily available data points, and less company sensitivity concerning issues of
confidentiality.
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9. Appendix
9.1 Survey Questionnaire
HARVARD BUSINESS SSCHOOL
V Hmavard Medical School
iir Massacdisetts Institute of Teclmology
4Q Center for Biomedical Innovation
Harvard-MIT Pharmaceutical Research Survey
This poll's results will not be available to respondents online.
CONFIDENTIALITY: All data provided by respondents in this survey questionnaire will be used in
aggregate and, under all circumstances, all inputs will remain anonymous. Neither the poll author
nor other study researchers will have access to individual identifying information. Data will be sent
directly to the primary researcher at Harvard University and MIT for study purposes only, and in
no case will data be transmitted to managers or supervisors at your company/organization. This
survey will require about 10 minutes to complete. Your input is very important to us, for the
thoroughness of our research study. Thank you for your assistance.
QUESTION 1:
What is your age?
Numeric answer required, use numbers only, with a decimal point and/or minus if necessary.
QUESTION 2:
How long have you been with the organization/firm? (years)
Numeric answer required, use numbers only, with a decimal point and/or minus ifnecessary.
QUESTION 3:
What is your highest educational level achieved?
A. r High School
B. :r University/college
C. r M.D.
D. r Ph.D.
E. r M.D. and Ph.D.
F. r Other
QUESTION 4:
How would you describe your nationality/ethnicity/cultural identity?
.j
Text Limit: 250 characters (approximately 5 lines)
QUESTION 5:
What key factor is responsible for driving yourself to perform in your day-to-day
professional role?
A. r Financial incentives
B. r Loyalty to company
C. r Commitment to industry
D. r Family
E. r Contribution to society
F. r Personal goals
G. Cr Self-achievement
H. r Other
QUESTION 6:
What top 3 characteristics most accurately describes your work style?
Sd21"
Text Limit: 250 characters (approximately 5 lines)
QUESTION 7:
How would you describe the nationality of your company? Please choose the ONE (1)
best choice.
A. r Western
B. r U.S. (American)
C. r European
D. r French
E. r U.K. (British)
F. r German
Swiss
Asian
Japanese
Chinese
Combination of several national cultures
L. C Other
QUESTION 8:
How old is your organization's corporate history?
A. r 0-25 years
B. r 25-50 years
C. r 50-100 years
D. r 100+ years
QUESTION 9:
What do you perceive to be your organization's
discovery)?
core competencies/strengths (in drug
-j-J
Text Limit: 250 characters (approximately 5 lines)
QUESTION 10:
Does your organization's corporate history provide advantages or burdens for the
research staff? Please describe.
WfI
Text Limit: 500 characters (approximately
1o lines)10 lines)
QUESTION 11:
Has your organization undergone a recent merger, acquisition, or organizational
restructuring? If so, has this improved or weakened the drug discovery process? Please
__¢
j
describe.
ii9
41IJ
QUESTION 12:
What is the primary source of human talent for your research organization?
A. r Internal lateral transfers
B. r Domestic competitor firms
C. r Foreign competitor firms
D. r University
E. r Government
F. r Other
QUESTION 13:
What is your training background?
A. r Domestic university and scientific training
B. r Foreign university and scientific training
C. r Both
D. r Other
QUESTION 14:
What is the impact of proximity to competitor firms' research laboratories, if any?
LU2ji
Text Limit: 500 characters (approximately 10 lines)
QUESTION 15:
How receptive is the senior management of your research organization to new ideas?
A. r Very B. r Receptiv C. r NeutraD. r Not E. " Unreceptiv
receptiv e 1 very e
e receptiv
1^^___··11__····r·__1·_^__^^~~·^·_ ·~ ^__^·__ ·_^· ^^_ __I·I·_^i ~~^^_ ~_ ^·~^_I__·^^·_·_^ Irm ·_ ··
1
QUESTION 16:
How receptive is the senior management of your research organization to genomics
technology?
A. r Very B. " Receptiv C. C NeutraD. r Not E. r Unreceptiv
receptiv e 1 very e
e receptiv
e
QUESTION 17:
What is the rate of senior management's adoption of new technologies, such as
genomics?
A. r Very B. r Fast C. C NeutralD. r Slow E. r Very
fast slow
QUESTION 18:
What is the greatest source of resistance to adopting new technologies such as genomics
in your organization?
A. r Organization culture
B. r Peers/colleagues
C. r Senior management
D. r Subordinates
E. r Finance
F. r Other'
QUESTION 19:
Does your organization have any "star scientists"?
A. r Yes
B. r No
C. r Don't know
QUESTION 20:
If so, how many "star scientists" does your organization have?
A. r 0-5 B. r 5-10 C. C 10-15 D. " Over 15
QUESTION 21:
Please provide your definition of what is a "star scientist" in drug discovery research.
w"
Text Limit: 500 characters (approximately 10 lines)
QUESTION 22:
How many "star scientists" do you interact with on a weekly basis?
Numeric answer required, use numbers only, with a decimal point and/or minus if necessary.
QUESTION 23:
Please rank your company's level of aggressiveness in decision-making, pursuing new
technologies, entering into new fields. (Please rank: 1 to 10. 1 = Not aggressive, 10 =
Extremely Aggressive) s ct:
QUESTION 24:
When making critical decisions, does your organization focus more on achieving
immediate return (1-5 years) or investing in the future (beyond 5 years)?
A. r" Immediate (1-5 years) B. " Future (beyond 5 years)
QUESTION 25:
How often do you work in a cross-functional team environment, involving more than 3
different teams?
A. r Several B. r Several C. r Several D. r Several
times per times per times per times per
day week month year
QUESTION 26:
What is the average number of discussions, meetings, or interactions you have with 3rd
party biotechnology, pharmaceutical, university, or government life sciences researcher?
(per month)
A. r 1-5 B. C 5-10 C. r 15-20 D. r Over E. r Not
20 applicabl
e
_~~~_·I···_··_II··I·· I·XIIIIIIIIIIIXIIX
QUESTION 27:
What is the most important source of creativity or new ideas in drug discovery, for your
organization?
A. r EmployB. C EmployC. r"DomeD. r Forei E. r Your F. r Gen G. " Non-
ees ees stic gn organiz eral researc
(middle (senior comp comp ation's rese h staff
manage manage etitor etitor laborat arch or
ment) ment) firms firms ories staff manag
located ement
in other
countri
es
Thank you for your time!
9.2 Summary of Data from Survey Questionnaire Respondents
(Western: n = 18, Japanese: n = 13, Chinese: n = 10)
Question 1 What is your age?
Western
Japanese
Chinese
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0
Question 2 How long have you been with the
organization/firm? (years)
Western
Japanese
Chinese
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0
Question 3 What is your highest educational
level achieved?
High School
University/college
M.D.
Ph.D.
M.D. and Ph.D.
Other
High School
Universitylcollege
M.D.
Ph.D.
M.D. and Ph.D.
Other
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Question 5 What key factor is responsible for
driving yourself to perform in your
day-to-day professional role?
Financial incentives
Loyalty to company
Commitment to industry
Family
Contribution to society
Personal goals
Self-achievement
Other
Financial incentives
Loyalty to company
Commitment to industry
Family
Contribution to society
Personal goals
Self-achievement
Other
0% 10% 20% 30%
I Western
O Japanese
E Chinese
NI Western
: Japanese'
i Chinese
I
40% 50% 60%
Question 7 How would you describe the
nationality of your company?
Western
U.S. (American)
European
French
U.K. (British)
German
Swiss
Asian
Japanese
Chinese
Combination of several national
cultures
Other
Western
U.S. (American)
European
French
U.K. (British)
German
Swiss
Asian
Japanese
Chinese
Combination
Other
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Question 8 How old is your organization's
corporate history?
0-25 years
25-50 years
50-100 years
100+ years
0% 20% 40%
Question 12 What is the primary source of
human talent for your research
organization?
Internal lateral transfers
Domestic competitor firms
Foreign competitor firms
University
Government
Other
60% 80% 100% 120%
Internal lateral transfers
Domestic competitor firms
Foreign competitor firms
University
Government
Other
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Question 13 What is your training background?
Domestic university and
scientific training
Foreign university and scientific
training
Both
Other
60% 80% 100% 120%
N Western
0 Japanese
.1 Chinese
0-25 years
25-50 years
50-100 years
100+ years
1 Western
O Japanese
l2 Chinese
I Western
O Japanesei
0 Chinese
Domestic universi
scientific traini
Foreign universi
scientific train 0 Western
0 Japanese!
O Chinese
0% 20% 40%
Question 15 How receptive is the senior
management of your research
organization to new ideas? very receptrve
Very receptive
Receptive
Neutral Receptie
Not very receptive
Unreceptive Neutral
Not very receptive
Unreceptive
N Western
iO Japanese.
1 Chinese
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
I4UULIUI EUflU IUUFJLVC I LI~ O~I..
Ustion 10 I Now lreceptive is t L senillor
management of your research very receptive
organization to genomics
technology?
Very receptive Receptive
Receptive
Neutral Neutral
Not very receptive
Unreceptive Not very receptive
Unreceptive
i Western
O Japanese i
1' Chinese
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Question 17 What is the rate of senior
management's adoption of new
technologies, such as genomics? very fast
Very fast
Fast Fast
Neutral
Slow Neutral
Very slow
Slow
Very slow
INWestern
0 Japanese 'I
2 Chinese
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
Question 18 What is the greatest source of
resistance to adopting new
technologies such as genomics in Organization culture
your organization?
Organization culture Peers/colleague
Peers/colleagues
Senior management Senior management
Subordinates
Finance Subordinates
Other Finance
Other
m Western
I Japanese
12 Chinese
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Question 19 Does your organization have any
"star scientists"?
Yes
No
I don't know
Question 20 If so, how many "star scientists"
does your organization have?
0-5
5-10
10-15
Over 15
Yes
No
I don't know
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
0-5
5-10
10-15
Over 15
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
Question 22 How many "star scientists" do you
interact with on a weekly basis?
Question 23 Please rank your company's level of
aggressiveness in decision-making,
pursuing new technologies, entering
into new fields.
(Please rank: 1 to 10. 1 = Not
aggressive, 10 = Extremely
Aggressive)
Western
Japanese
Chinese
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Westem
Japanese
Chinese
0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0
Question 24 When making critical decisions,
does your organization focus more
on achieving immediate return (1-5
years) or investing in the future
(beyond 5 years)?
Immediate (1-5 years)
Future (beyond 5 years)
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
ilWestem
i Japanese
Ii Chinese
E Western
.0 Japanese
E Chinese
Immediate (1-5
years)
Future (beyond 5
years)
[;westemr
O Japanese[ Chinese
I~
i
Question 25 How often do you work in a cross-
functional team environment,
involving more than 3 different
teams?
Several times per day
Several times per week
Several times per month
Several times per year
Question 26 What is the average number of
discussions, meetings, or
interactions you have with 3rd party
biotechnology, pharmaceutical,
university, or government life
sciences researcher? (per month)
1-5
5-10
15-20
Over 20
Not applicable
Question 27 What is the most important source
of creativity or new ideas in drug
discovery, for your organization?
Employees (middle
management)
Employees (senior
management)
Domestic competitor firms
Foreign competitor firms
Your organization's laboratories
located in other countries
General research staff
Non-research staff or
management
Several times per day
Several times per week
Several times per month
Several times per year
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70
1-5
5-10
15-20
Over 20
Not applicable
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60
Employees (middle management)
Employees (senior management)
Domestic competitor firms
Foreign competitor firms
Your organization's laboratories located in
other countries
General research staff
Non-research staff or management
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100
%
i Westemrn
SJapanesel
:Chinese
E Westem
D Japanese
G Chinese
I Western
13 Japanese
0 Chinese
Selected Responses to Text-Based Questions
Western
Question 4 How would you describe your
nationality/ethnicity/cultural identity?
"WASP" (White Anglo-
Saxon Protestant)
"Caucasian"
"European"
"American"
[Individual country
nationalities]
Japanese
"Japanese"
"100% Japanese"
unlnese
"It is a newborn alliance of
several companies..."
"Chinese"
"We are very hard worker and
are polite, not challenging. We
are unified and favor not to be
special. We have many
traditions but are eager to
catch up new trends."
Question 6 What top 3 characteristics most accurately "Decisive, Focus on "Creative Original Accurate" "Work with energetic
describes your work style? execution, Ethical" youngers."
"Strategic, Goal-Oriented, "Promptness and accuracy" "Finish job and task effective."
Integrator"
"Long term vision of what is "Keep unity of my colleagues."
most important."
Question 9 What do you perceive to be your "Long term vision of what is "Supplying best-in-class "International standard and
organization's core competencies/strengths most important." product." quality; low cost."
(in drug discovery)?
"Combining new technologies "Medicinal chemistry" "Makes its best to be known
with traditional technologies." by others all of the world."
"Scientifically oriented "Close communication among
discovery organization functions in drug discovery."
coupled with highly developed
functional competencies,
outstanding in area of
chemistry and excellent in
terms of safety and
metabolism."
"Money"
Question 10 Does your organization's corporate history "Advantages: mission is clear, "Advantages: positive relations "No burdens at all. A new
provide advantages or burdens for the and guides all decisions with domestic collaborators. organization in a energetive
research staff? Please describe. Disadvantages: institutions of Burdens:lack of speed against country such as China...we
process ossified." global competitors." could take more advantage of
it."
"Advantage -- deep "Corporate history has "Definitely advantages. We've
knowledge base" provided pride." gained experience from
providing services...which
helps us with the
pharmaceutical clients."
"Risk averse culture from way "Change in the way of thinking
back... is painful." and in ourselves."
"Advantages in all of [our] "Still groping for new style after
capital." merger."
"Conservative culture is a
burden."
Question 11 Has your organization undergone a recent "Broke down barriers and "Strengthened disease area (Not applicable)
merger, acquisition, or organizational injected new ideas." and capacity of compound
restructuring? If so, has this improved or evaluation capability."
weakened the drug discovery process?
Please describe.
"Too early to tell." "Improved speed and
efficiency"
"Internally re-organized for
extreme efficiency."
"New franchise (matrix)
structure."
"Extra communication layers."
Western Japanese Chinese
Question 14 What is the impact of proximity to competitor "Easier to recruit talent and "No impact" "We have the same service
firms' research laboratories, if any? get together... informal and face the same
discussions." customers."
"Not much impact" "We do not exchange "Not much."
information with competitors."
"Keep the firms aligned in
approach."
"Difficulty in retaining staff"
Question 21 Please provide your definition of what is a "Internationally recognized as "Scientist who creates story "She/He must have achieved
"star scientist" in drug discovery research. leader in both academics and and validates the story." novel progress in
industry." research...or success in
business, or come up with
new idea."
"Ability to move programs "A researcher who is well "The ones that bring major
based on science rather than known, has published in top breakthroughs in the research
politics." journals." areas."
"Track record of impactful "Finding a novel mode of
discoveries." action."
"Has novel, creative ideas." "Unique idea, novel strategy"
9.3 Exemption Letter from Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental
Subjects
T Committee On the Use of Humans asM Experimental Subjects MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY77 Manausetts AvenueCamfidge. Massachusetts 02139
Building E 25-143B
(617) 253-6787
Trent Lu
Leigh Firn, Chair
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03/19/2007
Committee Action:
Committee Action
Date:
COUHES Protocol #:
Study Title:
Exemption Granted
03/19/2007
0701002107
Genomics Research and Cultivating Serendipity in Pharmacutical Drug Discovery:
Assessing the Future Comparative Compettiveness of R&D Productivity in the U.S.,
Japan, & China
The above-referenced protocol is considered exempt after review by the Committee on the Use of Humans as
Experimental Subjects pursuant to Federal regulations, 45 CFR Part 46.101 (b)(2) .
This part of the federal -regulations requires that the information be recorded by investigators in such a manner that
subjects cannot be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects. It is necessary that the information
obtained not be such that if disclosed outside the research, it could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or
civil liability, or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.
If the research involves collaboration with another institution then the research cannot commence until COUHES
receives written notification of approval from the collaborating institution's IRB.
If there are any changes to the protocol that significantly or substantially impact the rights of human subjects you must
notify the Committee before those changes are initiated.
You should retain a copy of this letter for your records.
To:
From:
Date:
